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INTRODUCTIONN o rule of evidence has provoked commentary so passionate or pro-fuse as that which permits impeachment of a testifying witness in a
criminal case by introducing that witness' previous convictions.I The en-
*Professor, University of Oklahoma College of Law. My thanks to colleagues who
reviewed a draft of this article: Art Greenbaum, Larry Herman, Lou Jacobs, Drew Ker-
shen, Charlie Krauskopf, Joan Krauskopf, Peter Kutner, Kevin Saunders, Bob Smith,
Bob Spector, Rick Tepker, Mickie Voges and Leo Whinery.
1. See, eg., Griswold, The Long View, 51 A.B.A. J. 1017 (1965); Ladd, Credibility
Tests-Current Trends, 89 U. Pa. L. Rev. 166 (1940) [hereinafter Ladd I]; Ladd, Tech-
niques and Theory of Character Testimony, 24 Iowa L. Rev. 498 (1939); Spector, Im-
peachment Through Past Convictions: A Time for Reform, 18 De Paul L. Rev. 1 (1968);
Note, To Take The Stand Or Not To Take The Stand: The Dilemma of a Defendant with
a Criminal Record, 4 Colum. J. L. & Soc. Probs. 215 (1968) [hereinafter Note, The Di-
lemma of a Defendant with a Criminal Record]; Note, Procedural Protections of the Crim-
inal Defendant-A Reevaluation of the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination and the Rule
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actment of the Federal Rules of Evidence in 1975 spurred a fresh wave of
critical commentary. Much of this scholarship castigated Rule 6092 as
unresponsive to the oft-stated assertion that impeaching a criminal de-
fendant and other defense witnesses by their former convictions fails to
advance appreciably the fact-finder's assessment of credibility. Rather,
such impeachment is unduly prejudicial to the defense.3 The danger is
Excluding Evidence of Propensity to Commit Crime, 78 Harv. L. Rev. 426 (1964); Note,
Impeachment of the Defendant-Witness by Prior Convictions, 12 St. Louis U.L.J. 277
(1968); Note, Other Crimes Evidence At Trial Of Balancing and Other Matters, 70 Yale
L.J. 763 (1961) [hereinafter Note, Other Crimes Evidence at Trial].
2. Federal Rule of Evidence 609 provides in pertinent part:
(a) General Rule. For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness,
evidence that the witness has been convicted of a crime shall be admitted if
elicited from the witness or established by public record during cross-examina-
tion but only if the crime (1) was punishable by death or imprisonment in excess
of one year under the law under which the witness was convicted, and the court
determines that the probative value of admitting this evidence outweighs its
prejudicial effect to the defendant, or (2) involved dishonesty or false statement,
regardless of the punishment.
(b) Time limit. Evidence of a conviction under this rule is not admissible if a
period of more than ten years has elapsed since the date of the conviction or of
the release of the witness from the confinement imposed for that conviction,
whichever is the later date, unless the court determines, in the interests of jus-
tice, that the probative value of the conviction supported by specific facts and
circumstances substantially outweighs its prejudicial effect. However, evidence
of a conviction more than ten years old as calculated herein, is not admissible
unless the proponent gives to the adverse party sufficient advance written notice
of intent to use such evidence to provide the adverse party with a fair opportu-
nity to contest the use of such evidence.
It must be acknowledged that Rule 609 worked substantial changes in impeachment
law by excluding much of the evidence freely admitted in earlier times, both as to remote
crimes and crimes of sex and violence. The law in existence prior to Rule 609 is described
in Ladd I, supra note 1, at 174-84. See generally Jones, Convicting the Innocent-Revis-
ited: A Remedy Afforded by Federal Rule 609, 38 J. Mo. Bar 168 (1982).
3. See Bridge, Burdens Within Burdens at a Trial Within a Trial, 23 B.C.L. Rev. 927
(1982); Glick, Impeachment by Prior Convictions: A Critique of Rule 609 of the Proposed
Rules of Evidence for U.S. District Courts, 6 Crim. L. Bull. 330 (1970); McGowan, Im-
peachment of Criminal Defendants by Prior Convictions, 1970 Law & Soc. Ord. 1;
Spector, Impeaching the Defendant by His Prior Convictions and the Proposed Federal
Rules of Evidence: A Half Step Forward and Three Steps Backward, 1 Loy. U. Chi. L.J.
247 (1970); Surratt, Prior-Conviction Impeachment Under the Federal Rules of Evidence:
A Suggested Approach to Applying the "Balancing" Provision of Rule 609(a), 31 Syracuse
L. Rev. 907 (1980); Note, Impeachment by Prior Conviction: Adjusting to Federal Rule of
Evidence 609, 64 Cornell L. Rev. 416 (1979); Note, Impeachment by Prior Convictions:
Procedural Problems, Substantive Dilemmas, and Constitutional Infirmities, 4 Crim. Just.
J. 223 (1980); Note, Impeachment Under Rule 609(a): Suggestions for Confining and
Guiding Trial Court Discretion, 71 Nw. U.L. Rev. 655 (1977) [hereinafter Note, Sugges-
tions for Confining and Guiding Trial Court Discretion].
One commentator asserts that introduction of prior crimes to impeach a criminal de-
fendant "is fundamentally at odds with due process of law." Nichol, Prior Crime Im-
peachment of Criminal Defendants: A Constitutional Analysis of Rule 609, 82 W. Va. L.
ReV. 391, 420 (1980); see also Beaver & Marques, A Proposal to Modify the Rule on
Criminal Conviction Impeachment, 58 Temp. L.Q. 585 (1985); Note, Constitutional
Problems Inherent in the Admissibility of Prior Record Conviction Evidence for the Purpose
of Impeaching the Credibility of the Defendant Witness, 37 U. Cin. L. Rev. 168 (1968).
But see Note, Impeachment With Prior Convictions Under Federal Rule of Evidence
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that evidence of prior crimes will lead jurors to infer not only a lack of
veracity of the defendant or his witnesses, but also a tendency to engage
in criminal activity.
The defendant who has previously transgressed thus confronts a harsh
dilemma: remain silent and risk the factfinder's intuitive conclusion that
an innocent person would be eager to relate his version of the facts, or
testify and substantially increase the risk of a guilty verdict. Several
commentators point to a burgeoning body of social psychology research
demonstrating that prior specific acts, even those resulting in conviction,
bear no relationship to current veracity. They argue that this data dis-
credits the premises upon which Rule 609 is based and that the rule
should be repealed in criminal cases.'
A recent spate of cases struggles with another "vexing question"'
posed by Rule 609-to what extent does the language of the rule permit
prior convictions to be used to impeach the credibility of witnesses in
civil litigation?6 The divergent constructions of Rule 609 propounded by
these courts7 have provoked yet another surge of scholarship focusing
upon the operation of this rule in the civil context.8 These scholars rec-
ommend that a federal trial judge be permitted to invoke the minimal
discretion afforded by Federal Rule 403 as a means of controlling the use
of prior convictions to impeach a witness in a civil proceeding.9
609(a)(1): A Plea for Balance, 63 Wash. U.L.Q. 469 (1985) [hereinafter Note, A Plea For
Balance] (arguing that Federal Rule 609 disadvantages the prosecutor and grants an un-
warranted "evidentiary windfall" to the criminal defendant that Congress should redress
by equalizing the balance of advantage for prosecution and defense).
4. See Beaver & Marques, supra note 3, at 603-21; Lawson, Credibility and Charac-
ter: A Different Look at an Interminable Problem, 50 Notre Dame Law. 758, 766-89
(1975); Mendez, California's New Law On Character Evidence: Evidence Code Section
352 and the Impact of Recent Psychological Studies, 31 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 1003, 1042-60
(1984); Spector, Rule 609: A Last Plea for its Withdrawal, 32 Okla. L. Rev. 334, 349-54
(1979).
5. Campbell v. Greer, 831 F.2d 700, 703 (7th Cir. 1987).
6. See, eg., Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., No. 87-5712 (3d Cir. Mar. 14) (prior
conviction admitted to impeach witness), cert. granted, 108 S. Ct. 2843 (1988); Campbell
v. Greer, 831 F.2d 700 (7th Cir. 1987) (same); Hannah v. City of Overland, 795 F.2d
1385 (8th Cir. 1986) (admission of prior convictions held harmless error); Wierstak v.
Heffernan, 789 F.2d 968 (1st Cir. 1986) (prior conviction excluded).
7. See infra text accompanying notes 32-51.
8. See Savikas, New Concepts in Impeachment: Rule 609(a), Federal Rules of Evi-
dence, 57 Chi. B. Rec. 76 (1975); Smith, Impeaching the Merits: Rule 609(a)(1) and Civil
Plaintiffs, 13 N. Ky. L. Rev. 441 (1987); Note, The Place for Prior Conviction Evidence in
Civil Actions, 86 Colum. L. Rev. 1267 (1986) [hereinafter Note, Prior Conviction Evidence
in Civil Actions]; Note, Prior Convictions Offered for Impeachment in Civil Trials: The
Interaction of Federal Rules of Evidence 609(a) and 403, 54 Fordham L. Rev. 1063 (1986)
[hereinafter Note, The Interaction of Federal Rules 609(a) and 403]; Note, Evidence-
Diggs v. Lyons: The Use of Prior Criminal Convictions To Impeach Credibility in Civil
Actions Under Rule 609(a), 60 Tul. L. Rev. 863 (1986); Note, The Interaction of Federal
Rules 609(a)(2) and 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence: Can Evidence of a Prior Con-
viction Which Falls Within the Ambit of Rule 609(a)(2) Be Excluded By Rule 403?, 50 U.
Cin. L. Rev. 380 (1981) [hereinafter Note, The Interaction of Rules 609(a)(3) and 403].
9. Federal Rule Evidence 403 provides:
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This Article urges that the practice of using convictions for impeach-
ment in the civil setting be abolished. Rule 609, as it affects civil cases, is
flawed in two respects. The first flaw is superficial; the rule is badly
drafted.1" If the practice of permitting civil witnesses to be impeached
with prior convictions is to continue, then this flaw can and must be
remedied by congressional amendment. The plain terms of Rule
609(a)(1) abrogate judicial discretion concerning the admissibility of
prior convictions to impeach civil witnesses. The rule mandates admis-
-sion of all convictions for crimes characterized as offenses of "dishonesty
or false statement" and all other felonies where probative value out-
weighs "prejudicial effect to the defendant."'" In spite of this, judicial
opinions construing Rule 609(a)(1) in the civil context are in disarray.
These drafting problems are addressed by two recent reports proposing
amendments to Rule 609(a). 2 These reports provide an essential,
thought-provoking and valuable contribution to the evolution of the Fed-
eral Rules of Evidence. The proposed versions clarify the rule's lan-
guage, but they perpetuate the broad use of civil witnesses' prior
convictions. 13
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substan-
tially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or
misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or need-
less presentation of cumulative evidence.
10. See 10 J. Moore, W. Taggart & J. Wicker, Moore's Federal Practice § 609.14[4],
at VI-148 (1987) (Rule 609(a)(1) "is deficient, in that it cannot be sensibly applied in civil
cases."); see also Campbell v. Greer, 831 F.2d 700, 703 (7th Cir. 1987) ("absurd" to
apply Rule 609 literally in civil cases); Moore v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 575 F. Supp.
919, 921 (D. Md. 1983) (Rule 609 is "tailored to criminal trials").
11. Fed. R. Evid. 609(a).
12. One report, by the Section of Criminal Justice of the American Bar Association
Criminal, is the first major reexamination of the Federal Rules of Evidence since their
enactment. Committee on Rules of Criminal Procedure and Evidence, Federal Rules of
Evidence: A Fresh Review and Evaluation, 1987 A.B.A. Sec. of Criminal Justice [here-
inafter ABA Proposed Draft]. The other report, the Proposed Amendments to the Fed-
eral Rules of Appellate Procedure, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure, Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure and the Federal Rules of
Evidence 109 S. Ct. 30 (Prelim. Draft 1988) [hereinafter Judicial Conference Draft],
promulgated by the Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Con-
ference of the United States, selects only Rule 609 for proposed revision.
13. The American Bar Association's version of Rule 609 provides in pertinent part:
(a) General Rule.
For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness, evidence that the wit-
ness has been convicted of a crime shall be admitted only if the crime:
(1) was punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of one year under the
law under which the witness was convicted, and the court determines that the
probative value of admitting this evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect; or
(2) involved untruthfulness or falsification, regardless of the punishment, un-
less the court determines that the probative value of admitting this evidence is
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. This subsection
(2) applies only to those crimes whose statutory elements necessarily involve
untruthfulness or falsification.
ABA Proposed Draft, supra note 12, at 56.
The Judicial Conference's version provides in part:
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The rule's second flaw is fundamental, and requires reassessment of its
underlying premises. Rule 609 is the product of the law's long-standing
and dogmatic assumptions that criminal convictions reflect character,
and that character determines veracity. Although intuitively appealing,
this assumption has been thoroughly undermined by social psychology
research.14 Moreover, in perpetuating unwarranted emphasis on who the
litigants are rather than on what they have done, Rule 609 redirects the
inquiry from the facts of the dispute to the morals of the parties, and thus
subverts the basic goal of fairness in the truth-seeking process. The mini-
mal discretion provided by Rule 403, even if operable under Rule 609, is
insufficient protection against this eventuality.
Periodic questioning of the values and premises underlying evidentiary
rules is necessary to streamline the rules, eliminate anachronistic provi-
sions, and "bring the law of evidence closer to reality in its truth finding
function."' 5 After thirteen years, the operation of the Federal Rules of
Evidence in civil litigation demonstrates that piecemeal judicial attempts
at clarification of Rule 609 are unavailing. These deficiencies can be rem-
edied only by drastic revision.16
(a) General Rule-For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness,
(1) evidence that a witness other than a criminal defendant has been con-
victed of a crime shall be admitted, subject to Rule 403, if the crime was
punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of one year under the law
under which the witness was convicted, and the evidence that a criminal de-
fendant has been convicted of such a crime shall be admitted if the court
determines that the probative value of admitting this evidence outweighs its
prejudicial effect to the defendant; and
(2) evidence that a witness has been convicted of a crime shall be admitted if
it involved dishonesty or false statement, regardless of the punishment.
Judicial Conference Draft, supra note 12, at 29.
The major difference between these two versions centers on the admission of prior
convictions not involving untruthfulness or falsification. The Judicial Conference draft
admits these convictions against all witnesses, except the criminal defendant, subject to a
Rule 403 balancing. See id. The American Bar Association's draft gives the trial judge
more discretion by excluding these convictions where the prejudice outweighs the proba-
tivity of the convictions. See ABA Proposed Draft, supra note 12, at 56. This Article
rejects the use of Rule 403 as a means of controlling the use of prior convictions for
impeachment purposes, see infra notes 232-40 and accompanying text, and therefore pre-
fers the adoption of the American Bar Association's version of Rule 609.
14. See Leonard, The Use of Character to Prove Conduct: Rationality and Catharsis in
the Law of Evidence, 58 U. Colo. L. Rev. 1, 25-31 (1986); see also supra note.4 and
accompanying text.
15. Ladd I, supra note 1 at 166; see ABA Proposed Draft, supra note 12, at 56; Judi-
cial Conference Draft, supra note 12, at 29.
16. The potential for skewed trial results occasioned by impeaching the criminal de-
fendant and defense witnesses is overwhelming, as persuasively argued by a number of
commentators. See, e.g., Gordon v. United States, 383 F.2d 936 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (fear of
admitting evidence of prior convictions may prevent defendant from testifying), cert. de-
nied, 390 U.S. 1029 (1968); Luck v. United States, 348 F.2d 763 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (same);
sources cited supra notes 1, 3-4. The scope of this Article, however, is restricted to civil
cases for at least three reasons. First, on pragmatic grounds, the practice of using prior
convictions as a credibility determinant in criminal cases "is firmly entrenched in our
jurisprudence." United States v. Martinez, 555 F.2d 1273, 1275 (5th Cir. 1977); see Ladd
1988]
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This Article first scans the legislative debate and deliberation that pre-
I, supra note 1, at 178. The protracted debate precipitated by the proposed Rule 609
during legislative hearings on the Federal Rules of Evidence attests to this fact. See infra
notes 18-31 and accompanying text. Unyielding opposition of prosecutors, combined
with legislative inertia, see Spector, supra note 4, at 337 n.19, and perhaps with well-
founded reluctance to tackle the "interminable" problem of convictions in criminal cases,
see Lawson, supra note 4, at 758, makes it unlikely that Congress would be amenable to
radical reform on the criminal side in the near future. See Diggs v. Lyons, 741 F.2d 577,
583 (3d Cir. 1984) (Gibbons, J., dissenting), cert denied, 471 U.S. 1078 (1985).
In contrast, the legislative furor provoked by Rule 609 focused upon its effect on the
criminal defendant because Congress wholly disregarded the application of Rule 609 to
civil litigants. See infra text accompanying notes 28-31. Thus, the pragmatic concerns
are absent when civil litigation is involved.
Second, abolishing the use of convictions to impeach witnesses in criminal cases raises
sixth amendment concerns. The constitutionality of the practice has never been success-
fully challenged, despite arguments that impeachment by prior convictions violates due
process and other constitutional safeguards. See, eg., Beaver & Marques, supra note 3, at
591-97 (violates right to trial by jury, right to testify and the equal protection clause);
Nichol, supra note 3, at 409-21 (violates right to trial by an impartial jury). However,
abolishing the practice in criminal cases would necessarily prevent the defendant from
attacking the prosecution witnesses' believability, and thus, might raise substantial ques-
tions of constitutional magnitude concerning the defendant's right to confront adverse
witnesses and to present evidence. See Leonard, supra note 14, at 49-50 (excluding de-
fendant's offer of character evidence would be constitutionally suspect); cf. Rock v. Ar-
kansas, 107 S. Ct. 2704 (1987) (exclusion of hypnotically refreshed memory violates
defendant's right to testify); Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308 (1974) (defendant's right to
cross-examine adverse witnesses outweighs state's interest in protecting confidentiality of
juvenile record); Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973) (defendant cannot be de-
nied opportunity to cross-examine or impeach adverse witnesses). Moreover, to trans-
form the impeachment process from a two-way to a one-way street by allowing the
defendant, but not the prosecutor, to make use of opposing witnesses' past convictions,
would raise serious questions about the overall appearance of fairness of the criminal trial
process. See Leonard, supra note 14, at 49; Note, A Plea for Balance, supra note 3, at
481-89. Unlike criminal matters, neither litigant in a civil dispute is entitled to special-
ized constitutional consideration, because identical due process guarantees protect both
equally.
The third reason that this article is confined to civil cases is that impeachment by prior
convictions in criminal cases presents subtle systemic considerations. Professor Leonard
argues, in a recent article, that the factor of rationality cannot wholly account for the
staying power of evidentiary rules pertaining to character proof. See Leonard, supra note
14, at 2. He attributes the continued longevity of character rules, including the rule
allowing impeachment by past convictions in criminal cases, to their utility in fulfilling
the function of "catharsis," defined as the need to admit evidence that is intuitively, if not
rationally, probative in order to assure societal acceptance of litigation results. See id. at
39-42, 49-50.
Moreover, as Professor Crump states convincingly, criminal litigation is a special ex-
ample of the proposition that the trial process encompasses more than a search for truth.
See Crump, How Should We Treat Character Evidence Offered To Prove Conduct?, 58 U.
Colo. L. Rev. 279, 280 (1987). A delicate balance must be maintained between the indi-
vidual and the state. The individual's constitutional rights warrant vigilant protection,
not only for the sake of the criminal defendant, but also in service of the collective rights
of society. Yet the state seeks not only to punish the guilty and vindicate the innocent,
but also to vindicate society's quest for justice. As Professor Crump points out, character
evidence might serve to recalibrate this balance in imperceptible ways. See id. at 280-84.
Significantly, the bulk of civil litigation addresses private disputes and traditionally
focuses upon resolution of disputed facts, rather than upon the identity of the parties.
This distinction is recognized by the absolute exclusion of character proof offered as cir-
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ceded Rule 609 to ascertain whether the legislature intended to grant
discretion to judges to exclude convictions in civil cases. Next, it exam-
ines judicial decisions construing the rule in civil cases to identify the
different positions courts have taken when prior convictions become an
impeachment device, and concludes that the resolution of this confict
does not lie with the courts. The Article then evaluates the traditional
view on this issue and demonstrates that the introduction of criminal
convictions into the civil litigation process is dysfunctional. Social psy-
chology research refutes the proposition that former convictions add pro-
bative weight to the credibility assessment. Moreover, revealing civil
witnesses' previous legal transgressions invites the factfinder to assess the
moral worth of witnesses and litigants, and to award or withhold dam-
ages accordingly. 7 Finally, the Article recommends that Rule 609 be
amended to ban the use of prior convictions to impeach civil witnesses.
cumstantial evidence of conduct. See Fed. R. Evid. 404, 405. Character evidence in civil
trials lacks the same intuitive appeal as an implicit explanation for the parties' conduct.
The "cathartic" trial function is thus fulfilled when trials are generally fair, and are gen-
erally perceived as fair. Alerting the factfinder to the moral failings of civil parties and
witnesses invites speculation as to the respective moral merit of the litigants and conse-
quent adjustment of awards accordingly. Thus, in civil cases, Rule 609 actually disserves
the "cathartic" function by undermining both the reality and the perception of fairness.
Finally, there is no residual societal interest in punishing the guilty or vindicating the
innocent, because civil trials revolve around providing appropriate relief to those who
prove cognizable injury. Unlike criminal cases, where the state assumes diverse roles-
litigant, representative of society in its quest for justice, protector of the individual de-
fendant's rights-there is no tension among the divergdnt state roles in civil cases. Ex-
cept where the state is itself a party, the state's interest lies solely in providing a forum
where civil disputes can be resolved equitably. The balance struck is generally between
individuals, and that balance, evenly struck, needs no recalibration.
Because the complex pragmatic, constitutional and systemic considerations that ac-
company the question of using criminal convictions in criminal litigation are absent in
civil litigation, the policy questions are crystallized, and presented in starker outline.
Another scope restriction of this Article should be explained. The arguments made
here-that prior convictions are invalid indicators of testimonial veracity, and import
unwarranted, harmful prejudice into the fact determination and thus distort the civil pro-
cess-are equally applicable to reputation and prior specific bad acts evidence. See Fed.
R. Evid. 608(a) and 608(b). This Article argues that all forms of character evidence
should be prohibited as impeachment tools in civil cases, unless character evidence
reveals a witness' bias. This Article focuses on past convictions because this form of
character impeachment is the most egregious, see infra note 181, and because the law
remains mindful of Justice Jackson's admonition regarding character evidence generally:
"To pull one misshapen stone out of the grotesque structure is more likely simply to
upset its present balance between adverse interests than to establish a rational edifice."
Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 486 (1948). Perhaps if the "misshapen stone"
of prior convictions is first extracted the remaining stones of reputation and specific bad
acts can be nudged out more readily in the future.
17. This problem is exacerbated in the civil rights actions brought by prisoners and
arrestees under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). See infra note 88.
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I. THE LEGISLATIVE STALEMATE: COMPROMISE
AFTER PITCHED BATTLE
The "labyrinthine history"18 of Rule 609, as well as judicial decisions
construing it,19 confirm that this rule emerged in its present form as a
deliberate, yet uneasy compromise between opposing positions in a
sharply-divided Congress.2° The disagreement concerned the effect that
using prior convictions of defense and prosecution witnesses as a credibil-
ity determinant would have on the criminal defendant.21
The version of Rule 609 submitted for legislative consideration excised
all judicial discretion; all felonies and crimen falsi offenses were admissi-
ble to impeach any witness, including a criminal defendant who chooses
to testify.22 Galvanized by this proposal, the House ultimately approved
a version that similarly abrogated judicial discretion, but authorized im-
18. United States v. Smith, 551 F.2d 348, 360 (D.C. Cir. 1976). The extensive legisla-
tive background of Rule 609 is exhaustively catalogued elsewhere. See Tobias, Impeach-
ment of the Accused by Prior Convictions and the Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence:
The Tortured Path of Rule 609, Hearings Before the Special Subcomrn. on Reform of
Federal Criminal Laws of the Comm. on the Judiciary, H.R. Rep. No. 2, 93d Cong., Ist
Sess. 105-15 (1973); 3 J. Weinstein & M. Berger, Weinstein's Evidence 609-609[01]
(1987) [hereinafter Weinstein's Evidence]; see also Diggs v. Lyons, 741 F.2d 577, 579-81
(3d Cir. 1984) (describing the extensive legislative history of Rule 609); United States v.
Lipscomb, 702 F.2d 1049, 1059-62 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (same).
19. See, e.g., Diggs v. Lyons, 741 F.2d 577, 580-81 (3d Cir. 1984); United States v.
Lipscomb, 702 F.2d 1049, 1063 (D.C. Cir. 1983); United States v. Smith, 551 F.2d 348,
361 (D.C. Cir. 1976); Garnett v. Kepner, 541 F. Supp. 241, 244 (M.D. Pa. 1982), super-
seded by Diggs v. Lyons, 741 F.2d 577 (3d Cir. 1984).
20. See, e.g., 120 Cong. Rec. 40,895 (1974) (statement of Rep. Hogan) (referring to
Rule 609 as a "rule which has caused considerable controversy and which was settled by
compromise in the committee of conference"); 120 Cong. Ree. 40,891 (1974) (statement
of Rep. Hungate) ("The conference rule strikes a middle ground" between the House and
the Senate versions); see also Smith, supra note 8, at 447-55 (analysis of house debates on
Rule 609); Surratt, supra note 3, at 917-21 (Rule 609 represents a congressional compro-
mise); Note, Prior Conviction Evidence in Civil Actions, supra note 8, at 1269-70 (Rule 609
was the subject of conflict in both houses).
The consideration Congress devoted to Rule 609 was exhaustive, much more than that
devoted to any other evidence rule. See United States v. Toney, 615 F.2d 277, 280 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 985 (1980); Weinstein's Evidence, supra note 18, 609[04], at
609-75.
21. See, e.g., 120 Cong. Rec. 37,075-83 (1974) (Senate debate on Senate Judiciary
Committee proposal); 120 Cong. Rec. 2375-82 (1974) (House debate on House Judiciary
Committee proposal). For a detailed description of the legislative debates see Smith,
supra note 8, at 447-55.
22. The Advisory Committee's proposal stated:
(a) General Rule. For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness,
evidence that he has been convicted of a crime is admissible but only if the
crime (1) was punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of one year under
the law under which he was convicted or (2) involved dishonesty or false state-
ment regardless of punishment.
56 F.R.D. 183, 269 (1973).
This proposal was the Advisory Committee's third published draft. Each draft had
provoked strident opposition from some segment of Congress.
The initial draft allowed impeachment by conviction for any felony or any crime in-
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peachment only by crimes of dishonesty and false statement. 23 The Sen-
ate, on the other hand, approved the automatic admissibility provisions
of the Advisory Committee proposal.24 Thus, the Conference Commit-
tee had to contend with a House proposal restricting impeachment to
convictions for crimes of dishonesty and false statement, and a Senate
proposal sanctioning impeachment by convictions for all felonies in addi-
volving dishonesty or false statement and afforded the trial judge no discretion to exclude.
See 46 F.R.D. 183, 295-96 (1969).
In response to criticism that this proposal ignored the discretionary approach formu-
lated by the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia in Luck v. United States, 348
F.2d 763 (D.C. Cir. 1965) and Gordon v. United States, 383 F.2d 936 (D.C. Cir. 1967),
the Advisory Committee next devised an unpublished draft that granted the trial judge
discretion to exclude non-crimen falsi felony convictions "lacking in probative value on
the issue of credibility." Weinstein's Evidence, supra note 18, % 609[01], at 609-51.
The second published draft extended judicial discretion to both dishonesty and false
statement crimes and other felonies. Exclusion was permitted, echoing the Rule 403
standard, when probative value "is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prej-
udice." 51 F.R.D. 315, 391 (rev. draft 1971). This incorporation of judicial discretion
displeased some members of Congress, who viewed it as contrary to a recent legislative
repudiation of the Luck-Gordon line of cases. District of Columbia Court Reform and
Criminal Procedure Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-358, See. 133(a), § 14-305(b)(1), 84 Stat.
473, 551 (codified at D.C. Code § 14-305(b)(1)). Senator McClellan rebuked the Com-
mittee for ignoring "the Congressional judgement on this matter," 117 Cong. Rec. 29,845
(1971), and proposed an amendment to the Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2078, that
would have restricted the Advisory Committee's rulemaking power. See Weinstein's Evi-
dence, supra note 18, 609[01] at 609-54 to -57. Apparently chastened, see Fed. R. Evid.
609 advisory committee's note, 56 F.R.D. 183, 270 (1973), the Advisory Committee sub-
mitted as its third, and final, published draft the nondiscretionary version it had proposed
three years earlier.
23. See H.R. Rep. No. 650, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 11, reprinted in 1974 U.S. Code
Cong. & Admin. News 7075, 7084-85. Initially, the House Special Subcommittee on
Reform of Federal Criminal Laws amended the Advisory Committee's submission by
restoring judicial discretion concerning non-crimenfalsi felonies. See id. But, citing con-
cerns of little relevance, unfair prejudice and deterrent effect on witnesses-particularly
on criminal defense witnesses-the House Committee on the Judiciary excised the grant
of discretion. See id. The House rejected a proposed amendment by Representative Ho-
gan, an attempt to withhold discretion in the opposite direction, which would have man-
dated admission of all felony and dishonesty and false statement convictions. See 120
Cong. Rec. 2375-76, 2393-94 (1974).
24. See 120 Cong. Rec. 37,075-76, 37,083 (1974). The Senate Judiciary Committee
took exception to the House version, viewing the dangers of prejudice and disincentive to
testify as far more burdensome to the criminal defendant-witness. See S. Rep. No. 1277,
93d Cong., 2d Sess. 14, reprinted in 1974 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 7051, 7060-
61. The Committee proposed that the criminal defendant be impeached only by prior
dishonesty and false statement crimes. See id. Other witnesses would be impeached by
other felony crimes if probative value outweighed prejudicial effect. See id. The Senate,
perhaps persuaded by Senator McClellan, rejected this committee version, and voted to
restore the Advisory Committee's proposal removing discretion to exclude either felonies
or dishonesty and false statement crimes. See 120 Cong. Rec. 37,075-76, 37,083 (1974).
Senator McClellan stated during the floor debate:
We have gone pretty far already in trying to protect criminals and granting
every advantage to them against society.... [The Judiciary Committee's propo-
sal would deprive jurors of] the right or the opportunity to weigh the testimony
of the defendant in light of the fact that the defendant is a convicted felon.
120 Cong. Rec. 37,076 (1974).
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tion to crimes of dishonesty and false statement. Both proposals, how-
ever, deemed it appropriate to extinguish judicial discretion as a means to
advance their respective policy objectives.25 The Conference Committee
crafted the compromise eventually approved by both houses.26 This
compromise preserved the nondiscretionary admissibility of convictions
for dishonesty and false statement offenses, but vested discretion in the
trial judge concerning convictions for other felonies. These convictions
are available for impeachment only where their probity outweighs their
prejudicial effect to the defendant."
Although it was apparent that Rule 609 would apply with equal force
in civil and criminal litigation," there is a conspicuous absence in the
legislative history of thoughtful consideration of the rule's implications
for civil cases.29 Even the Conference Committee, fixated upon the pol-
25. The inimical policy objectives advanced by the House and Senate reflect the dif-
ferent concerns that predominated in each group. The House majority sought to safe-
guard the criminal defendant's unfettered choice as to whether to take the stand, and to
obviate the likelihood that jurors would misuse the impeachment evidence as proof of a
criminal propensity. The Senate majority, in contrast, sought to preserve the prerogative
of the jury to convict those tried for criminal offenses, even on the basis of highly prejudi-
cial information. See Surratt, supra note 3, at 929. As Judge Weinstein states:
The controversy engendered [by Rule 609] is attributable to the subject matter
of the rule which involves two, sometimes conflicting, ends of the criminal
law-safeguarding the innocent and punishing the guilty. Permitting unlimited
use of defendant's criminal past for impeachment undoubtedly results in more
convictions; it also increases the likelihood that a person will be found guilty
who, this time at least, has not committed a crime. Limiting the use of convic-
tions for impeachment provides more protection for the innocent, but it also
raises the spectre of the guilty out on the streets because the jury has been
denied information helpful in evaluating the credibility of witnesses.
Weinstein's Evidence, supra note 18, 609[01], at 609-49 to -50; see also United States v.
Jackson, 405 F. Supp. 938, 942 (E.D.N.Y. 1975) (Rule 609 embodies the policy of en-
couraging defendants to testify without sacrificing the government's case).
26. See 120 Cong. Rec. 40,070, 40,896-97 (1974).
27. See Fed. R. Evid. 609(a)(1). As one commentator points out: "[I]t was the as-
sumptions underlying both versions that were the subject of compromise. It appears
likely that those who voted to accept the compromise version read into it their own con-
cerns, exemptions, and interpretations." Smith, supra note 8, at 455 (emphasis in origi-
nal). Both House and Senate were apprised that the Federal Rules of Evidence would be
approved or rejected in toto. See 120 Cong. Rec. 40,896 (1974) (statement of Rep.
Smith). Given the enormous amount of time and effort Congress spent considering the
Federal Rules, there was a marked reluctance to reject particular provisions. 120 Cong.
Rec. 40,069 (1974) (statement of Sen. McClellan).
28. See Fed. R. Evid. l101(b); H.R. Rep. No. 650, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 11, reprinted
in 1974 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 7075, 7084; Federal Rules of Evidence: Hear-
ings on H.R. 5463 Before the Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 19 (1974).
29. The Senate floor debates are devoid of reference to the rule's impact on civil cases.
See, e.g., 120 Cong. Rec. 37,076-80 (1974) (no mention of civil cases in debate on pro-
posed amendment). In the House, four representatives made fleeting reference to the fact
that the rule would apply equally to witnesses in civil cases. These passing remarks en-
gendered neither discussion nor controversy. See 120 Cong. Rec. 2,377 (1974) (statement
of Rep. Dennis); id. at 2,379 (statement of Rep. Hogan); id. at 2,379 (statement of Rep.
Wiggins); id. at 2,381 (statement of Rep. Lott).
As to prosecution witnesses, Congress plainly viewed Rule 609 as absolute, allowing
trial judges no discretion to exclude prior felony or crimen falsi convictions. See 120
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icy objectives furthered by its compromise proposal in the criminal con-
text, kept silent concerning the rule's ramifications in civil litigation.3 °
Despite the vigorous debate and conscientious consideration lavished
upon the implications of Rule 609 for criminal defendants, the rule's ap-
plication to civil litigants appears to have emerged as a consequence of
legislative ennui. Congress simply overlooked the effects of the rule's
language on civil cases, or at best, cast a weary, apathetic glance in that
direction.31
Cong. Rec. 40,891 (statement of Rep. Hungate) (Rule 609 "means that in a criminal case
the prior felony conviction of a prosecution witness may always be used"); id. at 40,894
(statement of Rep. Dennis) ("[n]ow a defendant can cross examine a government witness
about any of his previous felony convictions; he can always do it, because that will not
prejudice him in anyway [sic].... Only the Government is going to be limited."). It is
also interesting that the type of information some members of Congress sought to provide
for in Rule 609, such as government witnesses' bargains with the prosecutor in exchange
for favorable testimony, is readily admissible to show bias, and is not within the ambit of
the prior convictions rule. See 120 Cong. Rec. 2,378-79 (1974) (statements of Reps.
Brasco and Hogan).
30. The Conference Committee Report focuses solely on criminal trials in explaining
the judicial discretion provided by Rule 609(a)(1):
With regard to the discretionary standard established by paragraph (1) of Rule
609(a), the Conference determined that the prejudicial effect to be weighed
against the probative value of the conviction is specifically the prejudicial effect
to the defendant. The danger of prejudice to a witness other than the defendant
(such as injury to the witness' reputation in his community) was considered and
rejected by the Conference as an element to be weighed in determining admissi-
bility. It was the judgment of the Conference that the danger of prejudice to a
nondefendant witness is outweighed by the need for the trier of fact to have as
much relevant evidence on the issue of credibility as possible. Such evidence
should only be excluded where it presents a danger of improperly influencing
the outcome of the trial by persuading the trier of fact to convict the defendant
on the basis of his prior criminal record.
120 Conf. Rep. No. 1597, 93d Cong. 2d Sess. 9-10, reprinted in 1974 U.S. Code Cong. &
Admin. News 6098, 7103 (emphasis in original). Juxtaposition of the verb "to convict"
and the noun "the defendant" shows that the grant of judicial discretion is circumscribed
to the use of felony convictions to impeach a criminal defendant. See id. The legislators
apparently adopted this construction and confined their comments on the Report to the
criminal context. See 120 Cong. Rec. 40,891 (1974) (statement of Rep. Hungate); id. at
40,894 (statement of Rep. Dennis); id. at 40,895 (statement of Rep. Hogan).
31. Judge Gibbons has noted "the snippets of legislative history in which four Mem-
bers of Congress anticipated that some court might reach so ridiculous a result" as to
admit all previous felony convictions against all civil witnesses. See Diggs v. Lyon's, 741
F.2d 577, 583 (3d Cir. 1984) (Gibbons, J., dissenting); supra note 29. But he remained
unpersuaded "that the result was intended by Congress." See Diggs, 741 F.2d at 583. He
further declared:
The overwhelming weight of the legislative background material on Rule 609
suggests a preoccupation by Senator McClellan and others with defendants in
criminal proceedings. The result was, in my view, a legislative oversight as to
the legislation's effect upon civil plaintiffs. By the time the oversight was recog-
nized by Congressmen Dennis, Hogan, Wiggins and Lott legislative fatigue had
set in ....
Id.; see Moore v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 575 F. Supp. 919, 921 n.I (D. Md. 1983) (legis-
lative failure to provide for civil cases "may have been an unintentional oversight");
Note, Prior Conviction Evidence in Civil Actions, supra note 8, at 1274.
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II. THE JUDICIAL RESPONSE: FLOUNDERING IN THE DARK
The current problems experienced in applying Rule 609 to the civil
context stem from Congress' focus on the criminal defendant. This con-
fusion among the courts emphasizes the need for amendment if the use of
prior convictions to impeach civil witnesses is to continue.32 Plainly,
Rule 609(a)(2) requires the admission of all convictions for crimes of dis-
honesty and false statement. Judicial agreement on this construction is
unanimous. 33 Courts differ, however, in construing Rule 609(a)(1)'s bal-
ancing proviso, which requires that the court heed only "prejudicial ef-
fect to the defendant." Most courts agree that "the defendant" refers to
the criminal accused;34 otherwise, Rule 609(a)(1) would permit the civil
defendant, but not the plaintiff, to object to the use of his criminal record
for impeachment purposes. 35 If the discretionary balancing process ex-
plicitly permits judicial screening of felony convictions offered to im-
peach the criminal defendant and defense witnesses, by what standard
does the trial judge decide whether to admit felony convictions offered to
impeach civil witnesses? Three distinct views have emerged on this issue.
Under one view, all felony convictions of all civil witnesses are auto-
matically admissible36 because Rule 609(a)(1) literally allows discretion
only in evaluating convictions that adversely affect the criminal defend-
32. See Campbell v. Greer, 831 F.2d 700, 703 (7th Cir. 1987) ("Rule 609(a) ... needs
some judicial patchwork."); Moore v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 575 F. Supp. 919, 920 (D.
Md. 1983) ("The Federal Rules of Evidence provide poor guidance as to whether crimi-
nal convictions are admissible to attack the credibility of a non-party witness in a civil
case. No rule expressly deals with this situation.").
33. See United States v. Kueker, 740 F.2d 496, 501 (7th Cir. 1984); United States v.
Wong, 703 F.2d 65, 66-68 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 842 (1983); United States v.
Kiendra, 663 F.2d 349, 354 (1st Cir. 1981), overruled on other grounds, Luce v. United
States, 469 U.S. 38, 40 (1984); United States v. Leyva, 659 F.2d 118, 122 (9th Cir. 1981),
cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1156 (1982); United States v. Toney, 615 F.2d 277, 279 (5th Cir.
1980).
34. See, e.g., Campbell v. Greer, 831 F.2d 700, 703 (7th Cir. 1987); Roshan v. Fard,
705 F.2d 102, 104 (4th Cir. 1983) (dictum); Boyer v. Chicago and N.W. Transp. Co., 603
F. Supp. 132, 133 (D. Minn. 1985); Moore v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 575 F. Supp. 919,
920-21 (D. Md. 1983); Tussel v. Witco Chem. Corp., 555 F. Supp. 979, 983-84 (W.D. Pa.
1983); Ball v. Woods, 402 F. Supp. 803, 811 n.19 (N.D. Ala. 1975), aff'd, 529 F.2d 520
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 940 (1976); see also S. Saltzberg & K. Redden, Federal
Rules of Evidence Manual 520-21 (4th ed. 1986). But see Diggs v. Lyons, 741 F.2d 577,
581 (3d Cir. 1984) (apparently viewing "to the defendant" as encompassing both civil and
criminal defendants); but see also Green v. Shearson Lehman/American Express, Inc.,
625 F. Supp. 382, 383 (E.D. Pa. 1985) (dictum) (novel construction of "to the defendant"
as refering "to the person who was the defendant in the criminal case resulting in the
felony conviction").
35. According to one court, "[tlhat would indeed be absurd. It would load the dice in
favor of defendants in civil cases, even though it is often a matter of happenstance in a
civil suit which party is plaintiff and which defendant." Campbell v. Greer, 831 F.2d
700, 703 (7th Cir. 1987); see 3 D. Lousell & C. Mueller, Federal Evidence § 316, at 324-
25 n.26 (1979); S. Saltzberg & K. Redden, supra note 34, at 520.
36. See Campbell, 831 F.2d at 703-08; Diggs v. Lyons, 741 F.2d 577, 579-83 (3d Cir.
1984); NLRB v. Jacob E. Decker & Sons, 569 F.2d 357, 362-63 (5th Cir. 1978); Garnett
v. Kepner, 541 F. Supp. 241, 244-45 (M.D. Pa. 1982); Ball v. Woods, 402 F. Supp. 803,
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ant. These courts reason that Congress intended Rule 609(a) to be the
sole provision governing witness impeachment by former convictions.
The residual discretion afforded by Rule 403 does not apply because Rule
609(a) specifically addresses circumstances under which judicial discre-
tion is permitted.37 Under this absolutist approach, all felony convic-
tions of all civil witnesses are available for impeachment under Rule
609(a)(1). Moreover, all convictions for crimes of dishonesty and false
statement are available under Rule 609(a)(2). 8
A second approach evaluates civil witnesses' felony convictions under
the prescribed balancing test of Rule 609(a)(1).19 This interpretation
treats the rule's specification of "to the defendant" as the equivalent of
"to the witness against whom the conviction is offered" in a civil case.
Consequently, felony convictions of civil witnesses are admitted when the
conviction is more helpful in assessing veracity than it is prejudicial.
The third view resorts to the residual balancing provision, Rule 403.
Some courts in this third group deem the Rule 609(a) balancing process
inapplicable to civil cases, holding that Congress' preoccupation with
mitigating prejudice to the criminal defendant and defense witnesses does
not reflect an intent to restrict judicial discretion in civil cases.' Rules
102 and 6111 vest discretion in the trial judge to construe the Federal
811 n.19 (N.D. Ala. 1975), aff'd, 529 F.2d 520 (5th Cir.), cert denied, 426 U.S. 940
(1976).
The author of the majority opinion in Diggs v. Lyons, Senior Circuit Judge Albert B.
Maris, is the former chairman of the Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Pro-
cedure of the Judicial Conference of the United States, and an important participant in
the development of the Federal Rules of Evidence. Judge Mars expressed his misgivings
concerning his absolutist approach to Rule 609(a):
We have felt compelled to give the rule the effect which the plain meaning of its
language and the legislative history require. We recognize that the mandatory
admission of all felony convictions on the issue of credibility may in some cases
produce unjust and even bizarre results. Evidence that a witness has in the past
been convicted of manslaughter by automobile, for example, can have but little
relevance to his credibility as a witness in a totally different matter. But if the
rule is to be amended to eliminate these possibilities of injustice, it must be done
by those who have the authority to amend the rules, the Supreme Court and the
Congress. We, therefore, leave the problem to them. It is not for us as enforc-
ers of the rule to amend it under the guise of construing it.
Diggs, 741 F.2d at 582.
37. See Campbell, 831 F.2d at 705-07; Diggs, 741 F.2d at 581-82.
38. Regardless of the approach adopted concerning discretion under Rule 609(a)(1),
courts unanimously agree that Rule 609(a)(2) mandates admission of all convictions for
dishonesty and false statement offenses. See cases cited supra note 33.
39. See Petty v. Ideco, 761 F.2d 1146, 1152 (5th Cir. 1985); Murr v. Stinson, 752 F.2d
233, 234-35 (6th Cir. 1985); Lenard v. Argento, 699 F.2d 874, 895 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
464 U.S. 815 (1983); Howard v. Gonzalez, 658 F.2d 352, 359 (5th Cir. 1984); Calhoun v.
Baylor, 646 F.2d 1158, 1163 (6th Cir. 1981); Green v. Shearson Lehman/American Ex-
press, Inc., 625 F. Supp. 382, 383 (E.D. Pa. 1985) (dictum).
40. See Donald v. Wilson, 847 F.2d 1191, 1197 (6th Cir. 1988); Moore v. Volkswa-
genwerk, A.G., 575 F. Supp. 919, 920-23 (D. Md. 1983); Tussel v. Witco Chem. Corp.,
555 F. Supp. 979, 981-85 (W.D. Pa. 1983).
41. See Fed. R. Evid. 102, 611.
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Rules of Evidence in accordance with principles of justice and fairness,
and to control the mode and manner of witness interrogation. Further,
Rule 403 allocates minimal residual discretion to the judge to exclude
unduly prejudicial evidence. These courts admit felony convictions of-
fered to impeach civil witnesses unless the evidence is substantially more
prejudicial than useful in evaluating credibility.42
Other courts following this third view have refused to confront the
issue whether Rule 609(a)(1)'s balancing proviso extends beyond the
criminal defendant. These courts construe Rule 403 as an overriding
provision "that cuts across the rules of evidence" 43 and thus do not reach
the issue of Rule 609's scope. Regardless of the application of Rule
609(a)(1) to civil litigation, Rule 403 affords the trial judge a modicum of
discretion to exclude a civil witness' unduly prejudicial felony
conviction.'
Courts permitting discretion in the civil impeachment process voice
concern that unchecked use of previous felony convictions will encourage
the jury to focus upon a comparative moral evaluation of the parties, and
calculate damages accordingly.45 This concern is warranted. The solu-
tion of resorting to Rule 403, however, is difficult to square with the
language of the rule. Rule 609(a) specifically governs the use of criminal
convictions to impeach. Congress incorporated in Rule 609(a)(1) a spe-
cialized balance that, by its terms, appears to be restricted to criminal
defendants. It is doubtful that Rule 403, a residual discretionary balanc-
ing provision, was intended to "overlap, supplant, or contradict the pol-
icy premises' 46 of a provision as precise as Rule 609(a)(1).
42. Clearly, reliance upon the Rule 403 balancing standard affords only slight protec-
tion to civil witnesses against prejudicial effects of their previous transgressions because it
is an inclusionary test, and affords the trial court only minimal discretion to exclude. See
Boyer v. Chicago & N.W. Transp. Co., 603 F. Supp. 132, 134 (D. Minn. 1985); Moore v.
Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 575 F. Supp. 919, 921-22 (D. Md. 1983); see also infra text ac-
companying notes 235-40, 252.
43. Shows v. M/V Red Eagle, 695 F.2d 114, 118 (5th Cir. 1983); see Jones v. Board of
Police Comm'rs, 844 F.2d 500, 504-06 (8th Cir. 1988); Diaz v. Cianci, 737 F.2d 138, 139
(1st Cir. 1984); Radtke v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 707 F.2d 999, 1000-01 (8th Cir. 1983);
Czajka v. Hickman, 703 F.2d 317, 319 (8th Cir. 1983).
44. Several other courts have acknowledged the question of Rule 609(a)(1)'s scope,
but have found resolution of the issue unnecessary. See Jones v. Collier, 762 F.2d 71, 72
n.2 (8th Cir. 1985) (source of balancing power not specified); Christmas v. Sanders, 759
F.2d 1284, 1291 (7th Cir. 1985) (defendant failed to preserve admissibility issue); Linskey
v. Hecker, 753 F.2d 1-99, 202 (1st Cir. 1985) (unnecessary to decide whether Rule 609 or
Rule 403 provides appropriate standard; under either approach, civil plaintiff's numerous
convictions properly admitted in a personal injury action).
45. See Shows v. M/V Red Eagle, 695 F.2d 114, 118-19 (5th Cir. 1983); Davenport v.
De Robertis, 653 F. Supp. 649, 659 (N.D. Ill. 1987), superseded by Campbell v. Greer,
831 F.2d 700 (7th Cir.), modified, Davenport v. De Robertis, 844 F.2d 1310 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 57 U.S.L.W. 3280 (1988); Boyer v. Chicago & N.W. Transp. Co., 603 F.
Supp. 132, 134 (D. Minn. 1985). For a discussion of the prejudice inherent in introduc-
ing convictions in civil cases, see infra text accompanying notes 82-114.
46. Campbell v. Greer, 831 F.2d 700, 705 (7th Cir. 1987); see also Diggs v. Lyons,
741 F.2d 577, 581-82 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1078 (1985).
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Furthermore, it is clear that Rule 403 does not modify the mandatory
provisions of Rule 609(a)(2). 7 It strains logic to view Rule 403 as modi-
fying one subsection of a specific rule containing its own balancing pro-
viso, but not as modifying the other subsection, where neither the rule
nor its legislative history reveals any intent to invoke Rule 403's residual
discretion.48
Even if Rule 609(a)(1) is amenable to constructions granting discretion
to exclude civil witnesses' convictions, the rule should be amended to
provide clarity and precision. 9 Congress enacted the Federal Rules of
Evidence to achieve uniformity and certainty in federal litigation. 0 That
goal cannot be attained if the use of prior convictions in the impeach-
ment process "depends on judicial construction contrary to the express
words of the Rule."'" The chaos in civil litigation engendered by Rule
609(a) confirms the need for amendment to promote clarity of construc-
tion and uniformity of decision. More importantly, it underscores the
need to reexamine the premises of the rule and its application, if any, in
the civil context. 2
47. See cases cited supra note 33.
48. See Campbell, 831 F.2d at 705-06.
49. See Diggs v. Lyons, 471 U.S. 1078 (1985) (White, J., Brennan, J., and Marshall,
J., dissenting from denial of certioran) (confusion among circuits requires action by
Supreme Court); Campbell v. Greer, 831 F.2d 700, 709 (Will, J., concurring) (Rule
609(a) should be amended to clarify its limited application to criminal defendants).
50. See S. Rep. No. 1277, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 1, reprinted in 1974 U.S. Code Cong. &
Admin. News 7051.
51. Savikas, supra note 8, at 82.
52. The Supreme Court could resolve the construction problems that plague Rule
609(a)(1) by propounding a definitive interpretation, as three members of the Court have
urged. See Diggs v. Lyons, 471 U.S. 1078 (1985) (White, J., Brennan, J., and Marshall,
J., dissenting from denial of certiorari). But Professor Lewis, in a recent article, warns of
the impracticability of requiring the judiciary to resolve a "multifaceted problem" con-
cerning the construction of a federal rule "through piecemeal adjudication." See Lewis,
The Excessive History of Federal Rule 15(c) and Its Lessons for Civil Rules Revision, 85
Mich. L. Rev. 1507, 1557-58 (1987). Case-by-case adjudication, he maintains, is a
salutory process by which disputes concerning the meaning of a particular rule are identi-
fied but
there comes a time when the accumulated results of adjudication yield dimin-
ishing returns.... If... a federal rule presents interpretive difficulties that are
susceptible of arbitrary resolution, I see no good reason to consign still more
lawyers and judges to wallowing around in the adjudicative abyss when crisp
answers are only a statute away.
Id. at 1558.
The difficulties courts have experienced in interpreting the language of Rule 609(a)(1)
reveal only the tip of the iceberg. The real difficulty, as discussed in the next section, is
the "multifaceted" and intractable problem of the utility of demonstrating bad character
by showing past criminal transgressions in order to impeach witnesses in civil cases. The
validity of the assumptions underlying this practice, as well as the implications for civil
dispute resolution, must be squarely confronted. This confrontation is best accomplished
through the legislative factfinding process, rather than by continued adjudication.
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III. CIVIL LITIGATION: LEGAL DETERMINATION
OR MORAL PRONOUNCEMENT?
The confusion engendered by the language of Rule 609(a)(1) presents
only a superficial problem. The fundamental dilemma is whether proof
of a witness' prior misconduct has any place in civil litigation. Visceral
evaluation of character plays an enormously significant role in our daily
lives. 3 A myriad of choices-whom we love and befriend, with whom
we socialize or do business, whom we deem worthy of professional sta-
tus5 # or advancement in the workplace, whom we support for public of-
fice-are profoundly influenced by our common-sense judgments about
another person's character.
At least two factors account for this emphasis. First, we perceive char-
acter as an anthology of specific traits, and we assume that these traits,
and therefore character itself, remain relatively stable throughout the
course of a lifetime. Knowledge of a person's character serves as a rough
predictor of that person's likely future conduct in the course of personal,
social, business or professional relationships.5 Second, judgments about
another's character, to some undefinable extent, are tinged with moral
overtones. Persons of unsavory character are deemed unworthy of our
association and we shrink from the prospect of another's bad character
being attributed to ourselves.
Although character is a significant factor in influencing everyday deci-
sions, the law excludes proof of both general character and prior specific
acts as circumstantial evidence of conduct in civil cases.5 6 Jurors are for-
bidden to draw inferences about the conduct on trial from their common-
sense judgments about either the litigants' general character or their pre-
vious specific behavior. This absolute exclusion focuses the factfinder on
disputed factual issues, and obviates the possibility that civil litigants'
cases will be evaluated on the basis of the moral attractiveness of parties
and witnesses, rather than the legal merit of their cases. 7 The law also
assumes, however, that "[w]hile truth is true whether it comes from a
polluted or a pure source, when facts are in dispute the source of the
conflicting testimony may cast light in determining what the truth is."5 8
Thus, the jury is encouraged to make inferences about a witness' veracity
at trial from that witness' previous behavior. Moreover, the law assumes
53. See Ladd I, supra note 1, at 171.
54. One commentator has questioned the current certification procedures for deter-
mining admissibility to the bar because of the inherent limitations in predicting moral
behavior and the subjectivity of bar standards. See Rhode, Moral Character as a Profes-
sional Credential, 94 Yale L.J. 491 (1985).
55. See Ebbesen, Cognitive Processes in Understanding Ongoing Behavior, in Person
Memory: The Cognitive Basis of Social Perception 179-225 (R. Hastie et al. eds. 1980)
(discussing alternative conceptions of the way in which persons encode, retain and re-
trieve information concerning others' behavior).
56. See Fed. R. Evid. 404, 405.
57. See C. McCormick, Evidence §§ 188-89, at 553-56 (3d ed. 1984).
58. Ladd I, supra note 1, at 171.
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that jurors, aided by proper instruction, are equipped to distinguish be-
tween evidence pertaining to witnesses' conduct and evidence relevant to
their credibility.59
The quest for truth and justice, and the fairness of the trial process
generally, are irrevocably impeded when "highly prejudicial evidence
that has no basis in fact" forms a basis for trial verdicts.6° Thus, critical
evaluation of the relative weight of the probity and prejudice inherent in
prior convictions proof is necessary to determine the utility of this im-
peachment information in civil litigation.
A. Inherent Probative Value and Prejudice of Prior Convictions
Evidence: A Critique of the Traditional View
Courts admit evidence of prior convictions for impeachment purposes
because jurors are accustomed to making judgments about another's
trustworthiness based on specific data about that person's previous be-
havior. 61 More importantly, prior convictions are regarded as valid in-
dicators of credibility, so that the jury would appear to be entitled to this
information as an aid to its factfmding function.62
Many types of information that jurors might find useful in discharging
this responsibility, however, are routinely rejected as trial proof to fur-
ther systemic policy objectives.63 Such restrictions help avoid the dan-
gers associated with evidence bearing only scant probative worth, but
tainted by the potential for overwhelming prejudice.' Even assuming
59. See Fed. R. Evid. 105.
60. See Mendez, supra note 4, at 1060.
61. "No sufficient reason appears why the jury should not be informed what sort of
person is asking them to take his word. In transactions of everyday life this is probably
the first thing that they would wish to know." State v. Duke, 100 N.H. 292, 293, 123
A.2d 745, 746 (1956); see also United States v. Palumbo, 401 F.2d 270, 273 (3d Cir. 1968)
(people want to be aware of prior convictions), cert denied, 394 U.S. 947 (1969).
62. See United States v. Martinez, 555 F.2d 1273, 1275 (5th Cir. 1977); Richards v.
United States, 192 F.2d 602, 605 (D.C. Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 946 (1952).
63. Constitutional privileges, such as the fourth amendment's exclusionary rule, see
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 649 (1961), and the fifth amendment's privilege against self-
incrimination, see Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964), often operate to deprive the
factfinder of vital information in service of fundamental societal goals. Evidentiary privi-
leges exclude much information that is relevant to disputed issues of fact for purposes of
fostering societally-sanctioned relationships. See Fed. R. Evid. 501; C. McCormick,
supra note 57, §§ 72-72.1, at 170-72. Article IV of the Federal Rules of Evidence in-
cludes a number of provisions that exclude arguably reliable information in order to fur-
ther significant policy objectives. See Fed. R. Evid. 407 (subsequent corrective measures),
408 (compromise attempts), 409 (offers to fund an injured person's medical expenses),
410 (offers to enter a plea of guilty).
64. See, e.g., Fed. R. Evid. 404, 405 (character), 411 (insurance), 412 (previous sexual
behavior of complaining witness in sexual offense prosecution); see also United States v.
Alexander, 526 F.2d 161, 168 (8th Cir. 1975) (polygraph results); People v. Shirley, 31
Cal. 3d 18, 68, 641 P.2d 775, 805, 181 Cal. Rptr. 243, 274, cert. denied, 459 U.S. 860
(1982) (hypno-induced evidence not per se inadmissible but subject to prejudicial error
test); State v. Hurd, 86 N.J. 525, 536, 432 A.2d 86, 91 (1981) (hypno-induced evidence
only admissible upon fulfillment of established safeguards).
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that prior convictions evidence is somewhat probative of in-court verac-
ity, the danger exists that jurors will misuse this information. This con-
sideration is wholly unrelated to the goal of fairness in the trial process,6"
and indeed, may be inimical.
The validity of prior convictions as an indicator of veracity at trial
depends upon a double inference: first, an individual who has engaged in
serious criminal activity has manifested utter disregard for governing so-
cial norms;" and second, an individual so bereft of integrity67 and re-
spect for "the social norms evidenced by positive law"68 is more likely to
lie than other witnesses. As best articulated by Justice Holmes:
[W]hen it is proved that a witness has been convicted of a crime, the
only ground for disbelieving him which such proof affords is the gen-
eral readiness to do evil which the conviction may be supposed to
show. It is from that general disposition alone that the jury is asked to
infer a readiness to lie in the particular case, and thence that he has
lied in fact. The evidence has no tendency to prove that he was mis-
taken, but only that he has perjured himself, and it reaches that con-
clusion solely through the general proposition that he is of bad
character and unworthy of credit.69
Thus, the utility of prior convictions proof is to discredit generally the
witness' character for veracity. The "general readiness to do evil"
manifests the witness' similarly general incredibility: "It is not the spe-
cific tendency of the witness to falsify but the general bad character of the
witness as evidenced by the single act of which he was convicted that
creates the basis of admissibility., 7' This same premise-"that crooked-
ness and lying are correlated" 71-is the guiding force of Rule 609(a).
In civil cases, the probative value calculus for prior convictions ap-
65. As one commentator has observed:
Accuracy is an aspect of fairness. The goal of fairness is thus not ignored by
defining unfair prejudice as the danger presented by evidence tending to pro-
mote inferential error. Admittedly, however, fairness in the law of evidence
often means considerably more than accurate factfinding. The law is replete
with rules which, in the cause of fairness, exclude highly probative evidence and
thus detract from the goal of accuracy.
Gold, Federal Rule of Evidence 403: Observations on the Nature of Unfairly Prejudicial
Evidence, 58 Wash. L. Rev. 497, 507 (1983).
66. See Mills v. Estelle, 552 F.2d 119, 120 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 871
(1977); Brown v. United States, 370 F.2d 242, 244 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
67. See State v. Duke, 100 N.H. 292, 123 A.2d 745 (1956).
68. Mills, 552 F.2d at 120.
69. Gertz v. Fitchburg R.R., 137 Mass. 77, 78 (1884). Senator McClellan similarily
stated:
Surely a person who has committed a serious crime-a felony-will just as
readily lie under oath as someone who has committed a misdemeanor involving
lying. Would a convicted rapist, cold-blooded murderer or armed robber really
hesitate to lie under oath any more than a person who has previously lied?
Would a convicted murderer or robber be more truthful than such a person?
120 Cong. Rec. 37,076-077 (1974) (statement of Sen. McClellan).
70. Ladd I, supra note 1, at 176.
71. Campbell v. Greer, 831 F.2d 700, 707 (7th Cir. 1987).
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pears to have two components:72 the degree to which the offense for
which the witfiess was convicted directly implicates veracity; and the im-
portance of the credibility question, and thus the need for impeachment
data.
73
Rule 609(a) articulates a "sliding scale" determination of probative
value.74 Offenses that directly reveal previous lack of veracity-perjury,
forgery, subornation of perjury, bribery, fraud, embezzlement, false pre-
tenses7 5-are deemed so probative of truth-telling that they must be ad-
mitted under Rule 609(a)(2).76 Other crimes, in contrast, reveal little
about veracity, and are less probative of credibility.77 Obviously, the pro-
bative worth of prior convictions evidence pales if the underlying as-
sumption-that the nature of the underlying offense is so indicative of
the in-court veracity of the offender-is undermined.78
72. A third factor, beyond the scope of this article, is remoteness of the conviction.
Federal Rule 609(b) presumes that convictions obtained more than ten years prior to
their use as impeachment tools are not probative, and places a heavy burden on the pro-
ponent to demonstrate the remote conviction's usefulness. Compare this with the Luck-
Gordon discretionary approach to probative worth of the criminal defendant's previous
convictions, which identifies five factors: (1) nature of the crime; (2) remoteness of the
prior conviction and the witness' subsequent history; (3) similarity between the past
crime and the charged crime; (4) necessity for the criminal defendant's testimony; and (5)
centrality of the credibility question. See Gordon v. United States, 383 F.2d 936, 940
(D.C. Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1029 (1968); Luck v. United States, 348 F.2d 763,
769 (D.C. Cir. 1965); Weinstein's Evidence, supra note 18, 609[03] at 609-64 to -73.
73. In another sense, the need for the impeachment data is a factor affecting the prej-
udicial nature of the evidence. See infra note 94 and accompanying text.
74. See Bridge, supra note 3, at 953; Surratt, supra note 3, at 930-31.
75. See Fed. R. Evid. 609, advisory committee's note, 56 F.R.D. 183, 270 (1972);
Surratt, supra note 3, at 931.
76. Fed. R. Evid. 609(a)(2). See Tussel v. Witco Chem. Corp., 555 F. Supp. 979, 983
(W.D. Pa. 1983); Judicial Conference Draft, supra note 12, at 29; ABA Proposed Draft,
supra note 12, at 56. Psychological research indicates, however, that specific acts of un-
truthfulness are not a reliable indicator of future untruthful behavior. See infra notes
117-40 and accompanying text. For the argument that any relationship between prior
criminal activity and in-court veracity is less than convincing, see infra text accompany-
ing notes 141-48 & 168-79.
77. See, e.g., Wierstak v. Hefferuan, 789 F.2d 968, 971-72 (1st Cir. 1986) ("theft,
stealth and drug use" deficient in probative value on proclivity to lie on the witness
stand); Christmas v. Sanders, 759 F.2d 1284, 1292 (7th Cir. 1985) (rape not highly proba-
tive of credibility); Davenport v. De Robertis, 653 F. Supp. 649, 658-59 (N.D. Ill. 1987)
(crimes not involving dishonesty or false statement only slightly probative on issue of
credibility), superseded by, Campbell v. Greer, 831 F.2d 700 (7th Cir.), modified, 844
F.2d 1310 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 57 U.S.L.W. 3280 (1988); Tussel v. Witco Chem.
Corp., 555 F. Supp. 979, 984 (W.D. Pa. 1983) (doubtful whether narcotics convictions
relevant to credibility in personal injury actions); Garnett v. Kepner, 541 F. Supp. 241,
244 (M.D. Pa. 1982) (convictions of second degree murder, burglary, arson, and reckless
endangerment only minimally probative on credibility). But see Diggs v. Lyons, 741 F.2d
577, 582 (3d Cir. 1984) (convictions for murder, attempted escape and criminal conspir-
acy highly probative of credibility), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1078 (1985); United States v.
Lipscomb, 702 F.2d 1049, 1053-54, 1058-60, 1070-71 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (legislative history
supports view that all felonies are probative of credibility; although less probative than
stealth or deception crimes, robbery probative of credibility because anyone desperate
enough to steal is desperate enough to lie).
78. See infra text accompanying notes 117-48.
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The importance of the credibility question is determined by the nature
of the case. Where plaintiff's and defendant's versions of the pertinent
facts sharply conflict in material respects, the need for effective credibil-
ity determinants increases. 79 If the link between a previous specific act-
conviction for a criminal offense-and a "general readiness to do evil"80
is demonstrably tenuous, then this need for credibility proof is better ful-
filled by other available, more effective, impeachment devices.8"
The intrinsic probative worth of prior convictions as credibility deter-
minants must be balanced against the unfair prejudice inherent in such
proof. If prejudice is defined as a tendency of information to persuade
the factfinder "to unintentionally commit an inferential error," 2 then the
prejudicial nature of prior convictions proof is obvious. The jury reasons
that a witness who has been convicted of criminal activity has flagrant
contempt for governing social norms and because the witness manifests a
"general readiness to do evil,"8 3 the witness is likely to be oblivious to the
moral constraints of testifying truthfully. Thus, jurors are instructed to
use their finding of a witness' disregard for social mores and accompany-
ing willingness to engage in criminal activity only in assessing the wit-
ness' veracity, even though the inference that a witness who has shown a
"general readiness to do evil"8 4 is morally reprehensible, and therefore
undeserving of justice,85 can be compelling. Even the deliberations of
conscientious jurors in this context are prey to contamination by inferen-
tial error in considering witnesses' prior convictions.
8 6
The prejudicial nature of past convictions as impeachment evidence in
79. See Christmas v. Sanders, 759 F.2d 1284, 1292 (7th Cir. 1985); United States v.
Lamb, 575 F.2d 1310, 1314 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 854 (1978); United States v.
Oakes, 565 F.2d 170, 173 (1st Cir. 1977); Smith v. United States, 406 F.2d 667, 668 (D.C.
Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 963 (1969); United States v. Jackson, 405 F. Supp. 938,
942-43 (E.D.N.Y. 1975). In Gordon v. United States, 383 F.2d 936 (D.C. Cir. 1967),
cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1029 (1968), Judge (later Chief Justice) Burger noted that "because
the case had narrowed to the credibility of two persons ... there was greater, not less
compelling reason for exploring all avenues which would shed light on which of the two
witnesses was to be believed." Id. at 941.
80. Gertz v. Fitchburg R.R., 137 Mass. 77, 78 (1884).
81. See infra text accompanying notes 108-14.
82. Gold, supra note 65, at 506. Professor Gold finds inferential error "when the jury
incorrectly decides that evidence is probative of an alleged fact or event," and "when the
jury decides that evidence is more or less probative of a fact or event than it is." Id.
83. Gertz, 137 Mass. at 78.
84. Id.
85. See Note, The Interaction of Rules 609(a)(2) and 403, supra note 8, at 380.
86. As Professor Gold states:
Prejudice resulting from evidence that induces inferential error is subtle because
it occurs when the jury diligently pursues the issues it is charged with deciding
but errs in a manner that may not be obvious to its members or to others. Such
prejudice is relatively common because.., humans regularly use flawed proce-
dures and preconceptions in evaluating evidence and drawing inferences there-
from. Prejudice resulting from evidence that induces inferential error is
dangerous precisely because it is so subtle and common.
Gold, supra note 65, at 507 (citations omitted).
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civil cases affects the general fairness of the trial process in several ways.
Introducing evidence as inflammatory as prior criminal conduct deflects
jurors from their obligation of neutrality by focusing their attention upon
the respective moral qualifications of the litigants, rather than upon the
specific conduct of the parties and the legal merits of their cases. s7 In-
forming jurors of a litigant's previous transgressions persuades them to
draw the compellingly close inference that bad character translates not
only into a lack of veracity, but also into improper conduct.88 Thus,
although substantive use of character as circumstantial proof of conduct
is strictly prohibited in civil cases,8 9 the temptation is overwhelming for
jurors to use the litigant's convictions not only in questioning whether
they should believe the litigant, but also in determining whether, in the
present case, the litigant actually acted in the manner alleged by his op-
87. One court has held that:
[t]he attention of the jury ... should properly focus on the conduct of the
plaintiff and the defendant with respect to the accident which gave rise to the
plaintiff's claim. Admitting [plaintiff's] conviction could only serve to poison
the minds of the jurors by arousing their punitive instincts thereby diverting
their attention from the issues that are central to this action.
Boyer v. Chicago and N.W. Transp. Co., 603 F. Supp. 132, 134 (D. Minn. 1985); see
Beaver & Marques, supra note 3, at 602.
88. The risk that inferential error will infect the jury's deliberation is particularly
aggravated when the government introduces prior convictions evidence against prisoners
and arrestees who file 1983 actions. Not only the plaintiff in these cases, but also most
of the plaintiff's witnesses, are convicted felons, and the jurors are already well aware of
this fact. See Furtado v. Bishop, 604 F.2d 80 (1st Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1035
(1980). Confronted by a number of unsympathetic witnesses who have manifested a dis-
regard for governing law, there is a great temptation to commit an inferential error by
assuming that the section 1983 plaintiff "provoked" or "deserved" the treatment of which
he complains, and in any event, is entitled to no further consideration by the legal system.
Introducing the convictions of plaintiff and his witnesses unnecessarily exacerbates the
problem. See Davenport v. DeRobertis, 653 F. Supp. 649, 659 (N.D. Ill. 1986) (prison-
ers' convictions very likely to suggest "to the jury that particular plaintiffs [are] evil men
who [do] not deserve consideration of their claims").
Yet, the cases reflect a judicial inclination to admit crimes of questionable probative
value for their impeachment utility, which is often marginal. See, e.g., Campbell v.
Greer, 831 F.2d 700, 703-05 (7th Cir. 1987) (inmate alleging cruel and unusual punish-
ment by prison guards and officials properly impeached by rape conviction that was the
reason for his incarceration); Wierstak v. Heffernan, 789 F.2d 968, 971 (1st Cir. 1986)
(arrestee alleging unjustified beating by police impeached by convictions for possession of
heroin, possession of hypodermic needles, attempted daytime breaking and entering,
grand larceny, possession of burglary tools, driving to endanger, and assault on a police
officer; fifteen year old convictions for nighttime breaking, entering and larceny and pos-
session of a harmful drug, and six year old convictions for possession of a hypodermic
needle and syringe and possession of a class A controlled substance excluded); Jones v.
Collier, 762 F.2d 71, 72 (8th Cir. 1985) (inmate in a suit against prison guards testified on
direct examination to his convictions for burglary and rape after trial court ruled them
admissible); Diggs v. Lyons, 741 F.2d 577, 579-80 (3d Cir. 1984) (state prisoner alleging
unconstitutional use of force in prevention of his escape, as well as denial of access to
legal assistance, impeached by convictions for two murders, bank robbery, attempted
prison escape and criminal conspiracy).
89. See Fed. R. Evid. 404, 405.
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ponent.90 Perhaps most troubling is the potential for civil litigants to
seek an inequitable advantage by trying to sway the jurors, and thus af-
fect the merits of the dispute, through demonstrating the moral depravity
of the opponent under the guise of presenting proper impeachment
proof.9 1
Once jurors are convinced that a litigant, with a prior criminal convic-
tion, is a bad person, there is a risk that they will evaluate the litigant's
evidence less conscientiously and thus reach a verdict contrary to what
their decision would have been absent the damaging convictions evi-
dence.92 Furthermore, jurors will be less reluctant to deprive the morally
reprehensible litigant of a verdict.93
The prejudice inherent in prior conviction evidence is magnified when
the witness already has been impeached by other credibility-testing meth-
ods. This is contrary to the judicial view that augmenting already-thor-
ough impeachment information by adding prior convictions data is
merely harmless error.94 Introducing a witness' prior convictions, when
there is no need for further insight into credibility, is an unwarranted
invitation to the jurors to appraise the moral attractiveness of the witness
and to use this information improperly.
The hapless civil litigant who has been convicted previously is virtually
powerless to combat these prejudicial ramifications. A civil litigant is
compelled to testify by the need to apprise the jury of his version of the
disputed facts. Often, only the parties have information that is vital to
the factfinder, or at least have more information than other witnesses.
Unlike the criminal defendant, the civil litigant enjoys no constitutional
90. See Diaz v. Cianci, 737 F.2d 138 (1st Cir. 1984); United States v. Martinez, 555
F.2d 1273 (5th Cir. 1977); United States v. Palumbo, 401 F.2d 270 (2d Cir. 1968), cert.
denied, 394 U.S. 947 (1969); see also Gold, supra, note 65, at 525 ("greatest danger is...
that they will convict because their conclusion that defendant is a bad person leads them
to draw inferences concerning his likely conduct that are not reasonable or are believed
with an unreasonable degree of certainty").
91. For examples of civil cases that provoke the suspicion that prior convictions im-
peachment proof was offered in the hope that jurors would use it substantively, see Lin-
skey v. Hecker, 753 F.2d 199 (1st Cir. 1985); Murr v. Stinson, 752 F.2d 233 (6th Cir.
1985); Diggs v. Lyons, 741 F.2d 577 (3d Cir. 1984); Radtke v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 707
F.2d 999 (8th Cir. 1983); Garnett v. Kepner, 541 F. Supp. 241 (M.D. Pa. 1982).
92. See Beaver & Marques, supra note 2, at 602; Smith, supra note 8, at 442.
93. See Shows v. M/V Red Eagle, 695 F.2d 114, 119 (5th Cir. 1983) (reversing ver-
dict for defendant because evidence of plaintiff's conviction for armed robbery "was
wafted before the jury to trigger their punitive instincts and there is a great risk that it did
so"); see also Mills v. Estelle, 552 F.2d 119, 120 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 871
(1977); Boyer v. Chicago and N.W. Transp. Co., 603 F. Supp. 132, 134 (D. Minn. 1985);
R. Lempert & S. Saltzburg, A Modem Approach to Evidence 218 (2d ed. 1983); Ladd I,
supra note 1, at 190-91; Sharpe, Two-Step Balancing and the Admissibility of Other
Crimes Evidence: A Sliding Scale of Proof, 59 Notre Dame L. Rev. 556, 560-61 (1984).
94. See, e.g., Christmas v. Sanders, 759 F.2d 1284, 1293 (7th Cir. 1985); Czajka v.
Hickman, 703 F.2d 317, 319 (8th Cir. 1983); Furtado v. Bishop, 604 F.2d 80, 93 (1st Cir.




protection in opting to forego the opportunity to testify.95
Moreover, the civil litigant is burdened by prejudicial effects of convic-
tion evidence when the litigant's witnesses are former convicts. No liti-
gant enjoys the prerogative of choosing occurrence witnesses. Potential
disclosure of a witness' shady past provides a potent disincentive to tes-
tify.96 Thus the civil litigant may be deprived of vital testimony. Even if
the previously convicted civil witness does testify, the jury, relying on the
common-sense "birds of a feather" notion,9" is likely to attribute the
moral depravity of the witness to the litigant who presented his
testimony.
Recent judicial developments reduce the likelihood that a civil litigant
can obtain an effective pretrial determination of the admissibility of his,
or his witnesses', prior convictions through a motion in limine.9 s Thus,
for the civil litigant concerned about potential use of his, or his witnesses'
prior convictions, there is no way to gauge before trial the risks attendant
to testifying.99
In response to recurring charges that introduction of prior convictions
under the guise of impeachment irrevocably taints the trial process, the
legal system steadfastly relies upon the limiting instruction. It maintains
that proper instruction on the restricted use of prior convictions is suffi-
cient to ensure the fairness of the trial process."co The doctrine of limited
95. Of course, the fact that the criminal defendant is constitutionally entitled to a
presumption of innocence does not mitigate the harshness of the dilemma confronting a
previously convicted defendant in determining whether to testify. However meager the
protection offered by these constitutional constraints is in reality, civil litigants cannot
avail themselves of it. Moreover, if a party does not testify, the adverse inference is that
the testimony would have been unfavorable, and nothing would prevent the opponent
from referring to this adverse inference during argument.
96. See Note, The Interaction of Rules 609(a)(2) and 403, supra note 8, at 380.
97. See, e.g., Diggs v. Lyons, 741 F.2d 577, 583 (3d Cir. 1984) (Gibbons, J., dissent-
ing); Radtke v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 707 F.2d 999, 1000-01 (8th Cir. 1983); United States
v. Lipscomb, 702 F.2d 1049, 1063 (D.C. Cir. 1983); see also Spector, supra note 4, at 347
(when a defendant's witness is impeached by prior convictions, the defendant risks being
associated with the witness as another criminal); Note, The Interaction of Federal Rules
609(a) and 403, supra note 8, at 1067 (same).
98. In Luce v. United States, 469 U.S. 38 (1984), the Court held that a criminal de-
fendant must testify in order to predicate error upon a claim of improper impeachment
by prior convictions; a defendant cannot argue on appeal that the trial judge's erroneous
ruling regarding the admissibility of his prior convictions improperly induced him to
forego testifying. The Court reasoned that in order to perform the balancing process
mandated by Rule 609(a)(1), "the court must know the precise nature of the defendant's
testimony, which is unknowable when.., the defendant does not testify." Id. at 41
(citation omitted). In Spell v. McDaniel, 606 F. Supp. 1416 (E.D.N.C. 1985), the court
applied the Luce rule in a civil action predicated on 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982). Id. at 1421.
99. In jurisdictions that adhere to an absolutist construction of Rule 609(a)(1) in civil
cases, see cases cited supra note 36, a pretrial calculation of the risks attendant to present-
ing testimony of a witness who has been convicted of a crime can be made based on the
knowledge that the witness' conviction will be admissible.
100. Note, Other Crimes Evidence at Trial, supra note 1, at 765. In State v. Duke, 100
N.H. 292, 123 A.2d 745 (1956), the court opined that "rules founded on the fear that the
Trial Judge will not use discretion and the jury be devoid of common sense tend to defeat
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admissibility,'' effectuated by the limiting instruction, plays a vital role
in the trial process without which the process could not function.' 0 2
Generally, the limiting instruction is effective in advising the jurors as to
the proper purpose for which they may consider evidence that may be
put to multiple uses. '03 But when the limiting instruction concerns prior
convictions admitted to impugn a civil party's in-court veracity, the jury
is required to use proof showing general moral perversion solely to deter-
mine whether the impeached party-witness should be believed, and to
disregard inferences that the witness' depravity affected his conduct in
the case and renders him unworthy of a favorable verdict. If the im-
peached witness is not a party, the jury is required to disregard the com-
pellingly close inference that the party is tainted by his witness'
immorality. Confining the consideration of prior convictions demands
tremendous sophistication because it is counter-intuitive, given the em-
phasis that most people place on character assessment in their daily lives.
Courts have expressed skepticism about the abilities of jurors to cope
with this incongruity."° Commentators are virtually unanimous in con-
demning as "mere legal sophistry"'' 0 the proposition that limiting in-
the whole purpose of trial by jury." Id. at 294, 123 A.2d at 746; see also Crump, supra
note 16, at 283 (experimental assessment that jurors "approach opinion and reputation
character evidence with the same sort of skepticism that a psychologist might"). But see
Leonard, supra note 14, at 47 ("factfinders are ill-equipped to judge the value of character
evidence"). Dean Griswold admonishes that the legal system tolerates excessive self-de-
ception concerning prior convictions and the utility of the limiting instruction:
We say that the evidence ... is admissible only to impeach... testimony, and
not as evidence of the prior crimes themselves. Juries are solemnly instructed to
this effect. Is there anyone who doubts what the effect of this evidence in fact is
on the jury? If we know so clearly what we are actually doing, why do we
pretend that we are not doing what we clearly are doing?
Griswold, The Long View, 51 A.B.A. J. 1017, 1021 (1965).
101. See Fed. R. Evid. 105.
102. See Parker v. Randolph, 442 U.S. 62, 74-75 (1979).
103. See Dolan, Rule 403: The Prejudice Rule in Evidence, 49 S. Cal. L. Rev. 220, 248-
50 (1976).
104. "The naive assumption that prejudicial effects can be overcome by instructions to
the jury, all practicing lawyers know to be unmitigated fiction." Krulewitch v. United
States, 336 U.S. 440, 453 (Jackson, J., concurring) (citation omitted). Judge Learned
Hand characterized the task allocated to jurors concerning prior convictions as "a mental
gymnastic which is beyond, not only their power, but anybody's else." Nash v. United
States, 54 F.2d 1006, 1007 (2d Cir.), cert denied, 285 U.S. 556 (1932); see United States
v. Lipscomb, 702 F.2d 1049, 1062 (D.C. Cir. 1983); United States v. Martinez, 555 F.2d
1273, 1275 (5th Cir. 1977); Tussel v. Witco Chem. Corp., 555 F. Supp. 979, 985 (W.D.
Pa. 1983); People v. Allen, 429 Mich. 558, 568-69, 420 N.W.2d 499, 504-05 (1988).
105. Beaver & Marques, supra note 2, at 602.
Professor Mendez observes that, while courts remain divided concerning the effective-
ness of limiting instructions, "at least some legal commentators have intuitively grasped
the emerging findings of psychologists and have urged that the ineffectiveness of limiting
instructions should be considered by trial judges in excluding evidence that may be un-
duly prejudicial." Mendez, supra note 4, at 1049; see Gold, supra note 65, at 527, 530;
Ladd I, supra note 1, at 176; Spector, supra note 4, at 347; Note, Prior Convictions Evi-
dence in Civil Actions, supra note 8, at 1268; Other Crimes Evidence at Trial, supra note I,
at 765, 777. See generally Note, The Limiting Instruction-Its Effectiveness and Effect,
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structions provide an antidote to the prejudice inherent in prior
convictions evidence. These suspicions about the efficacy of limiting in-
structions in relieving prejudice innate in prior convictions proof are am-
ply supported by empirical evidence.106 The practice of relying on
limiting instructions to rectify the unfairness posed by convictions evi-
dence is particularly insidious because jurors are likely to be unaware of
the intuitive appeal of this proof. Even conscientious, well-intentioned
jurors are likely to be affected.107
51 Minn. L. Rev. 264 (1966) (limiting instructions are ineffective in curing prejudice from
incompetent evidence).
106. The classic study is H. Kalven & H. Ziesel, The American Jury 160 (1966), which
reports the now-familiar conclusion that in criminal cases, jurors are unwilling or unable
to abide by judicial cautionary instructions concerning prior convictions. This conclusion
is based upon data that when the strength of the evidence is constant, jurors will acquit in
forty percent fewer cases if informed that the defendant has a criminal record. Interest-
ingly, the judge is also much less likely to acquit the previously-convicted defendant. See
id.; see also Broeder, The University of Chicago Jury Project, 38 Neb. L. Rev. 744, 747-53
(1959) (field studies on different variables that affect judge's decisions); Note, Other
Crimes Evidence at Trial, supra note 1, at 777 (" 'jurors almost universally used defend-
ant's record to conclude that he was a bad man and hence was more likely than not guilty
of the crime for which he was then standing trial' ") (quoting letter from Dale W. Broe-
der to Yale Law Journal (Mar. 14, 1960) (discussing intensive jury interviews)). Indeed,
the results of one survey indicate that ninety-eight percent of attorneys and forty-three
percent of judges queried expressed doubts that cautionary instructions are at all effec-
tive. See Note, The Dilemma of the Defendant with a Criminal Record, supra note 1, at
218.
Existing studies focus on the impact of prior convictions in criminal cases, and specifi-
cally on the criminal defendant. There is, however, no reason to assume that jurors are
better equipped in civil litigation to cope with the prejudicial information about moral
depravity conveyed by prior convictions. See supra text accompanying notes 82-94. This
conclusion is borne out by literature discussing the plight of civil plaintiffs--often poor,
uneducated, and previously convicted-who invoke § 1983 to sue police officers for dam-
ages following allegedly illegal searches and seizures. See, e.g., Casper, Benedict & Perry,
The Tort Remedy in Search and Seizure Cases: A Case Study in Juror Decision Making,
13 Law & Soc. Inquiry 279 (1988) (description of plaintiff's criminal past results in jury
bias in police misconduct trials); Foote, Tort Remedies for Police Violations of Individual
Rights, 39 Minn. L. Rev. 493 (1955) (same); Newman, Suing the Lawbreaker: Proposals to
Strengthen the Section 1983 Damage Remedy for Law Enforcers'Misconduct, 87 Yale L.J.
447, 454 (1978) (same); Project, Suing the Police in Federal Court, 88 Yale L.J. 781, 788-
809 (1979) (same); Note, Grievance Response Mechanisms for Police Misconduct, 55 Va.
L. Rev. 909 (1969) (same); infra note 115.
107. Professor Gold states that:
[I]nstructions may be considerably less efficacious than is commonly assumed.
When people are required to conduct self analysis in order to determine why
they act a certain way or think certain thoughts, they are subject to making the
same errors they tend to make when engaging in any other inferential task.
This suggests that, even if jurors diligently attempt to ignore the prejudicial
aspect of evidence as instructed by the court, they may not be conscious of the
impact that evidence has upon them and thus will be unable to control it.
Gold, supra note 65, at 527-28 n.134 (citations omitted); see Gold, Covert Advocacy: Re-
flections on the Use of Psychological Persuasion Techniques in the Courtroom, 65 N.C.L.
Rev. 481, 504 n.128 (1987). This conclusion is borne out by social psychology literature.
See, eg., Doob & Kirshenbaum, Some Empirical Evidence on the Effect of § 12 of the
Canada Evidence Act Upon an Accused, 15 Crim. L.Q. 88, 90 (1972) (limiting instructions
are not effective to combat prejudice from introduction of prior convictions); Hans &
19881
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
A plethora of impeachment devices-more effective than crude char-
acter proof because they more precisely reveal a witness' in-court verac-
ity-are available as safeguards in the critical credibility determination.
Each witness is subject to probing cross-examination concerning every
aspect of his testimony. 1 8 A witness' demonstrable biases can be ex-
posed 0 9 as can the witness' flaws affecting his ability to perceive, remem-
ber and articulate." 0 The witness' own damning prior statements can be
introduced to undermine trial testimony,111 and the witness can be con-
tradicted by any non-collateral information.1 " Especially when the testi-
fying witness is a party, or a person closely associated with a party, the
witness' interest is obvious, and jurors surely are capable of evaluating its
effect on the witness' faculties and testimonial veracity. In addition, ju-
rors will spontaneously derive impressions about the character and credi-
bility of litigants and witnesses from their appearance, apparel and
courtroom demeanor.11 3
Doob, Section 12 of the Canada Evidence Act and the Deliberations of Simulated Juries,
18 Crim. L.Q. 235, 249 (1976) (same); Sue, Smith & Caldwell, Effects of Inadmissible
Evidence on the Decisions of Simulated Jurors: A Moral Dilemma, 33 J. App. Soc. Psych.
345 (1973) (same); Wissler & Saks, On the Inefficacy of Limiting Instructions, 9 Law &
Hum. Behav. 37 (1985) (same); see also infra notes 150-79 & 245-48 and accompanying
text (discussing juror's responses to character evidence).
108. See R. Lempert & S. Saltzberg, supra note 93, at 352 (cross-examination is the
"most important" of trial safeguards to ensure testimony accuracy); 5 J. Wigmore, Evi-
dence § 1367, at 32 (Chadbourn rev. ed. 1974) ("[cross-examination] is beyond any doubt
the greatest legal engine ever invented for the discovery of truth"); Ladd I, supra note 1,
at 167-68 ("[G]eneral principles for examination of witnesses, not usually thought of in
connection with the tests of credibility, are important in permitting the triers of fact to
have ample opportunity to judge the truthfulness of testimony."). See generally F. Well-
man, The Art of Cross-Examination (4th ed. 1936) (anthology of examples of effective
discrediting of witnesses' testimony without resorting to previous convictions).
109. Revealing a witness' bias is the most persuasive of available impeachment devices
because it provides the jury with specific insight into a seemingly neutral witness' testimo-
nial bases. See 3A J. Wigmore, Evidence § 940, at 775-76 (Chadbourn Rev. ed. 1974),
§§ 948-69, at 783-820; see also Ladd I, supra note 1, at 171 (Bias evidence "is intangible
in its effect and yet gives the clearest insight to an understanding or explanation of testi-
mony given in court.").
110. See 3A J. Wigmore, supra note 109, §§ 931-39, at 758-75; Ladd I, supra note 1, at
170-71.
111. See 3A J. Wigmore, supra note 109, §§ 1017-46, at 993-1065; Ladd I, supra note
1, at 170.
112. See 3A J. Wigmore, supra note 109 §§, 1000-15, at 956-91. Of course, if a wit-
ness affirmatively claims to be a person of good character, evidence of prior wrongdoing,
including past convictions, is admissible as specific contradiction of that testimonial as-
sertion. See United States v. Jackson, 405 F. Supp. 938, 943 (E.D.N.Y. 1975).
113. See Ladd I, supra note 1, at 169-70; Mendez, supra note 4, at 1046; Slovenko,
Body Language on Trial, 66 Mich. B.J. 664 (1987); Walker, The Judge's Corner: The
Demeanor of the Witness, 59 Fla. B.J. 44 (1985). Any attempt to eliminate these natural
impressions from the factfinding process would prove futile. See Gold, Covert Advocacy:
Reflections on the Use of Psychological Persuasion Techniques in the Courtroom, 65
N.C.L. Rev. 481, 485 n.22, 486 n.24, 504 n.129, 506 (1987); Ladd I, supra note 1, at 169-
70. See generally Vinson, Litigation: An Introduction to the Application of Behavioral
Science, 15 Conn. L. Rev. 767 (1983) (jurors' impressions of another person proceed
according to the same laws of selective perception that they employ towards other stimu-
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Even under the traditional view, any scant benefit derived from relying
upon prior convictions as a veracity determinant is overwhelmed by the
massive, irreversible prejudice inherent in this proof.114 The overriding.
objective in civil litigation of premising verdicts solely upon the legal
force of the litigants' respective cases would be advanced by removing
from the trial process any reliance upon the litigants' and the witnesses'
moral rectitude. An absolute ban on prior convictions evidence is a nec-
essary prelude to achieving this goal.
B. Inherent Probative Value and Prejudice of Prior Convictions
Evidence: The Social Psychology Perspective
Under the traditional view, the probative worth of prior convictions
evidence as a credibility determinant is suspect,115 and the prejudice it
imports into the civil process is overwhelming. 1 6 The additional
hazards to the fairness of the trial process-identified by social psychol-
ogy studies-lead to the conclusion that prior convictions proof, as an
impeachment device, is bereft of both rational and scientific validity."'
This section briefly reviews the social psychology research probing the
assumed link between prior specific bad acts and lack of veracity and
finds the connection tenuous at best.1 8 This section also demonstrates
lae). But the intuitive appeal of character evidence, and the intrinsic, potent risk of in-
ducing inferential error that it engenders when introduced in the form of past criminal
convictions can be averted:
[W]e make no claim that we possess a precise gauge useable as a measure of the
corrosive bite of evidence categorized as prejudicial. There are no empirical
data or studies of psychological influence that can be brought to bear, at least
with any clear focus on a specific case. Instead we here express our awareness
of the reality of the courtroom by applying rules born of experience not logic,
derived intuitively and not mathematically.
Shows v. M/V Red Eagle, 695 F.2d 114, 119 (5th Cir. 1983).
114. See generally Gold, supra note 65, at 525 ("the most serious prejudicial danger...
is the possibility that jurors might consider such evidence probative of character and
conduct"); Lawson, supra note 4, at 777 (research in jury perceptions leaves "little doubt
that evidence of prior misconduct places a defendant in a generalized unfavorable light
with jurors"); Spector, supra note 4, at 351 (prior convictions evidence exerts a decisive
influence on the believability of a witness).
115. See supra notes 61-81 and accompanying text.
116. See supra notes 82-114 and accompanying text.
117. See Leonard, supra note 14, at 31; supra note 4 and accompanying text. Other
legal commentators have expressed similar conclusions. See, e.g., Lawson, supra note 4,
at 783 ("the theory of behavior that was so compatible with the law's notions about
character has ceased to have any scientific recognition") (emphasis in original); see also
Leonard, supra note 14, at 2 ("If the conclusions of the psychological community are
correct, the very foundation upon which the rationality of character evidence is based has
been removed."). The intuitive appeal of character traits as the source of human behav-
ior traces its roots at least as far back as Aristotle. See Rhode, supra note 54, at 556-57.
118. Contemporary legal commentators have been exploring the social psychology
literature analyzing the relationship between prior specific conduct and future untruthful-
ness for almost a decade and a half. Thus, there exists already an able, thorough body of
legal literature. See supra note 4; see also Leonard, supra note 14, at 2 (discussing the
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that jurors misuse evidence introduced under Rule 609(a).119
Historically, the primary premise of the law's reliance upon character
evidence has been the belief that character is a compilation of innate,
discernible traits that govern behavior patterns and remain relatively sta-
ble throughout the course of a person's lifetime. 120 The conception of
character as inducing behavior consistent with one's innate traits lends
credence to the practice of inferring character from specific conduct and
adverting to character evidence as a predictor of in-court veracity. 121
This perspective on behavior-predicting factors reinforces our "intuitive
sense of character." ' It also mirrors the "trait" or "generality" theory
of behavior advanced by social psychology research.
123
According to the trait theory, behavior derives from a unique combi-
nation of traits that make up the character of each individual. 124 Trait-
oriented psychologists focus on specific conduct that augurs the existence
of character traits.12 5  Behavior becomes predictable once underlying
generalized traits are discerned and identified. 26 Thus, a person who
manifests a character trait for aggressiveness would display belligerent
behavior in an unending variety of contexts: while driving on the high-
way, at a basketball game, or in the corporate boardroom. 127 Likewise,
the individual possessing a character trait for sociability would remain
affable in these contexts. 128 And, particularly pertinent to the impeach-
ment process, a person who would steal in one situation would also swin-
dle in another, cheat in a third, and lie whenever feasible. 129
impact of psychological research on the use of prior convictions to impeach); Rhode,
supra note 54, at 560 (same).
119. See supra note 4; see also Leonard, supra note 14, at 9-10 (juror's mind must
create generalizations to jump from the circumstantial testimony to the proposition of
veracity).
120. See Lawson, supra note 4, at 780. The "trait" theory was pioneered by Gordon
Allport, who theorized that character traits "are not creations in the mind of the ob-
server, nor are they verbal fictions; they are here accepted as biophysical facts, actual
psychophysical dispositions.... ." G. Allport, Personality-A Psychological Interpreta-
tion 339 (1937).
121. See 2 J. Wigmore, Evidence § 519, at 726 (Chadbourn Rev. ed. 1974); Spector,
supra note 4, at 350.
122. Leonard, supra note 14, at 26.
123. See infra note 125.
124. See H. Eysenck, Crime and Personality 20-21 (1977); Lawson, supra note 4, at
780; Leonard, supra note 14, at 26.
125. See G. Allport, supra note 120 at 286; Lawson, supra note 4, at 780-81; Mischel,
Jeffery & Patterson, The Layman's Use of Trait and Behavior Information to Predict Be-
havior, 8 J. Res. Personality 231, 231-32 (1974).
126. See H. Eysenck, supra note 124, at 20; S. Hampson, The Construction of Person-
ality 95 (1982).
127. See Mendez, supra note 4, at 1052-53; Mischel, Jeffery & Patterson, supra note
125, at 231-32.
128. See H. Eysenck, supra note 124, at 20.
129. See Burton, Generality of Honesty Reconsidered, 70 Psych. Rev. 481, 482 (1963);
see also Mendez, supra note 4, at 1052 (under trait theory, evidence of prior criminal




Attempts by trait-oriented psychologists to buttress their theory with
empirical data have failed utterly, 130 rendering it suspect as an overarch-
ing theory of behavior.131 Moreover, this trait-oriented theory of behav-
ior was discredited thoroughly by the advent of a counter-theory, termed
"specificity" or "situationism." '13 2
Situationism views behavior as a learned response to specific contex-
tual factors; 133 it is precise situational determinants that shape behav-
130. See W. Mischel, Personality and Assessment 123, 177 (1968); Bowers, Situation-
ism in Psychology: An Analysis and a Critique, 80 Psych. Rev. 307, 325 (1973); Burton,
supra note 129, at 482; Mendez, supra note 4, at 1052.
131. See D. Peterson, The Clinical Study of Social Behavior 23 (1968) (after ten years
of unproductive research, trait theory abandoned); P. Vernon, Personality Assessment:
A Critical Survey 239 (1964) (trait theory deemed invalid despite much research devoted
to it); Lawson, supra note 4, at 781 (general dissatisfaction with the theory); Mendez,
supra note 4, at 1052 (trait theory rejected).
132. A classic study, performed by Professors Hartshorne, May & Shuttleworth over a
period of five years in the 1920s, on more than 11,000 child-subjects between the ages of
eight and sixteen, has been described by a contemporary commentator as "a landmark
which has not been surpassed by later work." H. Eysenck, supra note 124, at 25. The
following sources report and analyze the results of that study: H. Hartshorne, Character
in Human Relations (1932); H. Hartshorne, M. May & F. Shuttleworth, Studies in the
Organization of Character (1930); H. Hartshorne & M. May, I Studies in the Nature of
Character-Studies in Deceit (1928).
These psychologists initiated their investigations in order to test the validity of the
concept that a character trait for "honesty" existed, a trait considered to determine a
person's moral behavior in a variety of situations. They devised over one hundred differ-
ent situations wherein the children studied could cheat, sometimes only with great diffi-
culty, and sometimes without fear of detection. All behavior was carefully monitored.
The researchers expected their results to accord with intuitive, generally-held notions
of character: that the behavior of an individual who is fundamentally honest will reflect
honesty in all situations, regardless of contextual incentives to be either honest or dishon-
est; and that a dishonest person would similarly behave dishonestly despite situational
differences. As Professor Hartshorne stated concerning expectations, "[a]t one end of the
scale we would have a piling up of saints and at the other sinners, with nothing much in
between." H. Hartshorne, supra, at 210.
Their results "surprised the experimenters and shocked the world of psychology."
Lawson, supra note 4, at 784. Some subjects manifested very little consistency of honest
or dishonest behavior. Some students cheated only on arithmetic tests, others only on
spelling tests, others only in classroom contexts, and still others only in extracurricular
games. The researchers could find no predictability concerning whether students would
cheat, and if so, under what circumstances. They concluded that the thousands of sub-
jects studied exhibited no unified character trait for honesty, and that honesty is primarily
a function of situational factors and not a consistent behavior determined by an underly-
ing character trait. See H. Hartshorne & M. May, supra, at 411-12; H. Hartshorne, M.
May & F. Shuttleworth, supra, at 1. Thus, as one prominent psychologist concluded,
"behavioral consistencies.., are constructed by observers, rather than actual consistency
in the subject's behavior." W. Mischel, supra note 130, at 43.
Regarding the use of children as experimental subjects, see H. Hartshorne, supra, at
209 ("[t]he average child is no better integrated in terms of an ethical idea than if he had
never heard of it").
133. As one commentator has stated:
[P]ast experience affects the individual's information processing strategies,
which govern the way situational variables are perceived, and hence their effects
on behaviour .... As a result of past experience, people approach situations
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ior."I Situation-oriented psychologists maintain that the predictability
of behavior derives from the correlation of identical elements shared by
the situations being compared,135 with even slight situational variances
drastically reducing predictive behavioral consistency. 136 Evidence that
a person would cheat on his income tax return or on the baseball field, or
deceive his counterparts in the corporate boardroom, bears meager pre-
dictive value for that person's veracity when testifying under oath. 37
Yet a third perspective on behavior is emerging. Termed "interaction-
ism," this approach merges aspects of the trait and situationism ap-
proaches. 138  Interactionism regards behavior as the product of both
innate character traits and contextual variables in which character and
context interact to some, as yet undefinable, degree to produce behav-
with characteristic modes of information processing which will determine the
unique meaning of that situation for that person.
... The major difference between [situationism] and traditional personality
theory is that the former does not depend on consistency to the same degree as
the latter, because it recognises that these cognitive person factors operate in
conjunction with situational factors to determine behaviour.
S. Hampson, supra note 126, at 77-78 (citation omitted); see also Burton, supra note 129,
at 482 (behavior is the product of the situation in which a person finds himself); Mischel,
Jeffery & Patterson, supra note 125, at 231 (same).
134. See generally H. Eysenck, The Structure of Human Personality 3 (1970); W. Mis-
chel, Introduction to Personality (1971); Bowers, supra note 130, at 307-08; Burton,
supra note 129, at 482.
135. Professor Burton explains:
The doctrine of specificity of moral behavior holds that a person acts in each
situation according to the way he has been taught to act under these particular
conditions. The predictability of one's moral behavior from one situation to
another depends on the number of identical elements which the two settings
share.
Burton, supra note 129, at 482; see also Mendez, supra note 4, at 1052-53 (research indi-
cates that behavior is determined by specific situations and is not easily predicted).
136. First, behavior depends on stimulus situations and is specific to the situation:
response patterns even in highly similar situations often fail to be strongly re-
lated. Individuals show far less cross-situational consistency in their behavior
than has been assumed by trait-state theories. The more dissimilar the evoking
situations, the less likely they are to lead to similar or consistent responses from
the same individual. Even seemingly trivial situational differences may reduce
correlations to zero.
W. Mischel, supra note 130, at 177 (emphasis added).
137. For example,
[Situationism] does not accept the abstract concept of "honesty" as a valid char-
acter trait, but instead argues that there are many different kinds of specific
behaviors which tend to be independent even though they may be included under
the same rubric. Therefore, knowing that a person has cheated in a final exami-
nation in no way permits one to predict what the same person would do if
tempted to cheat in a different setting such as a competitive game or business
venture. Furthermore, there is little if any association between the extent to
which a person will experience anxiety following a deviation in one moral area
with the intensity of guilt following deviation in a different area.
Burton, supra note 129, at 482 (emphasis added); see H. Eysenck, supra note 124, at 15;
H. Hartshorne & M. May, supra note 132, at 411-12; H. Hartshorne, supra note 132, at
209.
138. See S. Hampson, supra note 126, at 280.
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ior.139 It is this indeterminate blend that induces consistency.1"
Most social psychology theorists have rejected the trait theory, in
favor of either situationism or interactionism. 141 Decades ago, Dean
Wigmore criticized the law's reliance upon the predictive value of char-
acter for testimonial veracity,142 but concluded that rejection of the law's
dependence upon character proof should be postponed "until science
provides a better method." ' 3 During the intervening decades, social
psychology research has raised the possibility that the differences be-
tween situationism and interactionism as alternative perspectives on be-
havior-influencing considerations may never be wholly resolved."4 The
emergence of these divergent approaches to behavior determination, and
the consequent rejection of the trait-oriented approach by most psycholo-
gists, discredits the law's continued reliance on proof of character traits
to evaluate credibility.
It is no longer advisable to wait for a consensus on situationism, inter-
actionism or some yet-unarticulated approach. Further delay perpetu-
139. See id. at 78-95.
140. Continuing psychological research concerning the extent to which situation and
attitude determine behavior may provide a basis for finding predictability and consis-
tency. Researchers have determined, for example, that self-monitoring by individuals
affects consistency to some extent. In other words, consistency is more likely to be found
in subjects who regard their behavior as consistent. See generally, Bern & Allen, On
Predicting Some of the People Some of the Time: The Search for Cross-Situational Consis-
tencies in Behavior, 81 Psych. Rev. 506 (1974); Bem & Funder, Predicting More of the
People More of the Time, 85 Psych. Rev. 485 (1978); Gibbons, Sexual Standards and
Reactions to Pornography: Enhancing Behavioral Consistency Through Self-Focused At-
tention, 36 J. Person. & Soc. Psych. 976 (1978); Vestewig, Cross-Response Mode Consis-
tency in Risk-Taking as a Function of Research in Personality, 12 J. Res. Personality 152
(1978).
141. See S. Hampson, supra note 126, at 63; Lawson, supra note 4, at 782; see also
Bowers, supra note 130, at 308, 327. Even Allport, who pioneered the trait-oriented
approach, see G. Allport, supra note 125, at 286-343, has conceded the tenuousness of his
initial approach:
[M]y earlier views seemed to neglect the variability induced by ecological, so-
cial, and situational factors, This oversight needs to be repaired through an
adequate theory that will relate the inside [the psychic structure] and outside
[situational factors] systems more accurately.
Allport, Traits Revisited, 21 Am. Psychologist 1, 9 (1966). Interestingly, research into
character traits of criminals has yielded no clear-cut results concerning distinguishing
characteristics of persons in this group, as opposed to non-criminals, see S. Hampson,
supra note 126, at 256-60, a fact of particular significance in assessing the viability of Rule
609 in civil litigation.
142. Dean Wigmore aptly described the tension between law and psychology:
From the point of view of modern psychology, the moral disposition which
tends for or against falsehood is an elusive quality. Its intermittent operation in
connection with other tendencies, and the difficulty of ascertaining its quality
and force, make it by no means a feature peculiarly reliable in the diagnosis of
testimonial credit. Hence, to the psychologist, the common law's reliance on
character as an index of falsehood is crude and childish.
3A J. Wigmore, supra note 109, § 922, at 725 (footnote omitted).
143. Id.
144. See Leonard, supra note 14, at 30.
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ates the practice of introducing highly prejudicial information of dubious
probative worth for reasons largely historical '45 and intuitive, rather
than policy-oriented and rational. Although psychologists presently do
not agree as to precisely what mixture of facts shapes behavior, the great
majority- do agree as to what does not:146 the trait-oriented approach.47
This consensus, along with the complete failure of trait theorists to vali-
date their approach empirically, raises serious doubts about the value of
the trait-oriented approach as a tool in the impeachment process. 148
Social psychology data reflect the conclusion that prior convictions
have virtually no probative value as a predictor for determining a wit-
ness' in-court veracity. The question then becomes, to what extent is this
information unduly prejudicial? How do jurors perceive and integrate
prior convictions information, and to what extent does this information
induce inaccurate or distorted judgments? The law assumes that jurors
have the ability, aided by cautionary instructions, to place even highly
prejudicial information in appropriate perspective.149 This assumption is
belied15 by extensive, uncontroverted social psychology findings'51 that
serious distortions routinely plague the process by which impressions of
145. See Rhode, supra note 54, at 556-57.
146. See Lawson, supra note 4, at 773-74; Leonard, supra note 14, at 29-30, 37-42.
147. Professor Leonard describes the flaw in the trait theory as follows:
Of great importance to the use of character evidence in trials are two final
propositions demonstrated by psychological research. First, even if traits exist,
the existence or non-existence of a trait cannot be inferred in a particular indi-
vidual from a single observation of that person's conduct. A person's trait of
honesty, for instance, cannot be validly inferred from one situation in which the
person returned a lost credit card to its owner. The second proposition is the
converse of the first: even if we know a person's trait, it will not accurately
predict a single, isolated instance of conduct. Its true predictive value is only
achieved when a number of instances are considered: "[S]ince a trait is a gener-
alized tendency to behave in a certain manner, one may not exhibit trait-rele-
vant behavior in every situation or on different occasions in the same situation."
Leonard, supra note 14, at 29 (quoting Sherman & Fazio, Parallels Between Attitudes and
Traits as Predictors of Behavior, 51 J. Personality 308, 325 (1983)) (footnote omitted).
148. See Hampson, Honesty and Truthfulness as Measureable Personality Traits?, 38
Bull. British Psych. Soc'y 64 (1985) ("the notion that socially constructed traits such as
honesty can have straightforward biological counterparts now seems naive"); see also
Lawson, supra note 4, at 782-83 (expressing doubts about the value of the trait approach
in predicting behavior); Leonard, supra note 14, at 30-31 (same); Mendez, supra note 4, at
1058-59 (same); Spector, supra note 4, at 351 (evidence of character has no probative
value).
149. See supra notes 100-07 and accompanying text.
150. As one commentator put it:
In evaluating the prejudicial nature of evidence, courts have made many as-
sumptions about the inferential processes of jurors and the potential of evidence
to cause inferential error. These assumptions are usually unproven and uncon-
vincing. This should not be surprising, since judges do not necessarily have
more ability to analyze the inferential processes of the human mind than do the
jurors whose minds they attempt to analyze.
Gold, supra note 65, at 509 (footnote omitted).
15 1. See W. Mischel, supra note 130, at 41-59; Asch, Forming Impressions of Personal-
ity, 41 J. Abnormal & Soc. Psych. 258 (1946); Beaver & Marques, supra note 2, at 603;
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others, and consequent judgments about others, are formed. 52
One psychologist's investigation of laypersons' perspectives on charac-
ter reveals that, from an early age, people intuitively develop extensive,
complex theories about character that are used for descriptive and infer-
ential purposes.1 53 These beliefs permit people to distinguish among the
people they encounter in their everyday lives, and to predict their behav-
ior.154 However, these visceral beliefs often lead persons inadvertently to
overvalue specific acts as indicators of general character and to exagger-
ate the predictive value of a prior bad act for future conduct.
The most significant intuitively-held belief about character is the pro-
cess termed "attribution." 1 5 Under this view, people unwittingly tend to
attribute their own specific behavior to situational factors, but, when
viewing the acts of others, attribute their behavior to the presence of con-
sistent character traits.'56 Attribution is grounded in an innate tendency
to view others' characters as integrated and unified, predictable and sta-
ble. 57 People intuitively perceive that a previous particular act is the
product of the actor's disposition.55' Further, people predict that the
actor's future conduct will be consistent with that dispositional, or char-
acter, trait.' 59 The function of character traits is exaggerated, whereas
the function of situational variances as pivotal factors influencing the be-
havior of others is minimized."6
Gold, supra note 65, at 522; Lawson, supra note 4, at 767; Mendez, supra note 4, at 1044;
Spector, supra note 4, at 351-53.
152. As one commentator queried, "[w]hat happens when a person receives one spe-
cific piece of information about another person? Does the receiver simply record the data
and reserve judgment, or will the receiver generalize from the specific piece of informa-
tion to postulate a whole personality? Research shows that it is quite clearly the latter."
Spector, supra note 4, at 352 (footnote omitted); see also Ebbesen, Cognitive Processes in
Understanding Ongoing Behavior, in Person Memory: The Cognitive Basis of Social Per-
ception, supra note 55, at 216-21.
153. See S. Hampson, supra note 126, at 134.
154. See id.
155. See generally G. Allport, supra note 120, at 520 (describing this process as "so
persistent, and seemingly so unavoidable, that it should be constantly borne in mind"); K.
Shaver, An Introduction-to Attribution Process 1-7 (1975); Gold, supra note 65, at 522-
23 (referring to this process as "Fundamental Attribution Error"); Spector, supra note 4,
at 351 ("[o]ne of the more enduring propositions supported by psychological data"). For
a thorough discussion of the process of attribution see Lawson, supra note 4, at 776-79.
156. See S. Asch, Social Psychology 206 (1952); R. Nisbett & L. Ross, Human Infer-
ence: Strategies and Shortcomings of Social Judgment 31 (1980); Alexander & Epstein,
Problems of Dispositional Inference in Person Perception Research, 32 Sociometry 381,
383-84 (1969); Asch, supra note 151, at 284-85. Thus, an individual attributes his own
abrupt behavior to a "bad day," while perceiving other similarly abrupt persons as "iras-
cible" or "grouchy."
157. See Alexander & Epstein, supra note 156, at 382-83; Asch, supra note 151, at 284-
85; Ichheiser, Misunderstandings in Human Relations-A Study in False Social Percep-
tion, 55 Am. J. Sociol. 1, 27 (1949); Lawson, supra note 4, at 772-76.
158. See Alexander & Epstein, supra note 156, at 382-84; Asch, supra note 151, at 258.
159. See R. Nisbett & L. Ross, supra note 156, at 31; Alexander & Epstein, supra note
156, at 382-84.
160. See F. Heider, The Psychology of Interpersonal Relations 169-70 (1958); Alexan-
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Two aspects of this attributional process are particularly important.
First, the "halo effect" describes the tendency to overestimate the role
that one known characteristic, good or bad, plays in the character of
another.161 If one dominant character trait is found-often inferred from
a specific act-the observer extrapolates other, similar characteristics,
and assumes that these characteristics are part of the observed person's
character. 162 Moreover, there is a tendency to oversimplify the effect of
the "known" characteristic on the total character make-up of the person
observed.
1 63
These correlative processes, attribution and the "halo effect," interre-
late as follows. A homeowner engages a contractor for minor home re-
pairs. The contractor arrives four hours late and takes eight hours,
rather than the three hours previously estimated, to complete the agreed-
upon work. The homeowner might conclude that the contractor is not
conscientious. A neighbor, upon hearing this reference, would be likely
to assume further, from this limited description, that the contractor was
also "unreliable, .... lazy," "careless" and "disorderly.""'
The second significant aspect of the attribution process is a phenome-
non known as "communicator credibility."' 16  Studies demonstrate that
the effectiveness of a communication corresponds closely to the audi-
ence's attitude toward the communicator.' 66 Audiences are significantly
influenced by the speaker's character in evaluating the persuasiveness of
the speech.167
der & Epstein, supra note 156, at 383, 384; Ichheiser, supra note 157, at 46-47. But see
Mischel, Jeffery & Patterson, supra note 125, at 241, concluding that lay persons use both
trait and behavioral information in making predictions.
161. See G. Allport, supra note 120, at 521.
162. See id.; S. Hampson, supra note 126, at 99. See generally Rosenberg & Olshan,
Evaluative and Descriptive Aspects in Personality Perception, 16 J. Personality & Soc.
Psychol. 619, 619-20 (1970) (study confirming that favorable inferences are drawn from
one or more favorable traits).'
163. See Ichheiser, supra note 157, at 46-47.
164. See S. Hampson, supra note 126, at 99. Professor Hampson explains:
When we compose a spoken or written description of ourselves or others, a part
of that description will probably consist of personality traits: we are able to
convert our direct experience of a person into a more abstract form expressed in
a series of traits. These descriptions are usually meaningful to others, as is
demonstrated by the second use of implicit personality theory: inferring the
presence of additional traits on the basis of a brief trait description.
Id.
165. See Lawson, supra note 4, at 767.
166. C. Hovland, I. Janis & H. Kelley, Communication and Persuasion 19-21 (1953);
H. Kelman & C. Hovland, "Reinstatement" of the Communicator in Delayed Measure-
ment of Opinion Change, 48 J. Abnorm. & Soc. Psych. 327, 327-35 (1953).
167. For the classic study on "communicator credibility," see C. Hovland, I. Janis &
H. Kelley, supra note 166, at 31-33. An identical tape of a speech concerning juvenile
delinquency was played for several different audiences, each of whom was asked before-
hand to judge its educational value. One group of audiences was told that the speaker
was a juvenile court judge, "a highly trained, well-informed, and experienced authority
on criminology and delinquency." Id. at 31. A second group of audiences was told that
the speaker was a randomly-chosen member of the audience, but was provided no other
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These social psychology data have obvious implications for the prac-
tice of using criminal convictions to impeach civil witnesses. Psycholo-
gists' conclusions that behavior is substantially situation-oriented, and
not derived wholly from character traits, are counter-intuitive to the av-
erage person, who is likely to predict behavior based on perceived char-
acter traits. Despite the minimal value of convictions evidence for
predicting in-court veracity, jurors are likely to attribute overall bad
character to the impeached witness from the fact of a former conviction.
Indeed, the inference of general bad character is the appropriate infer-
ence that jurors are expected to draw from this proof. 68 From this infer-
ence of general bad character, jurors are likely to attribute similar
negative characteristics to the witness, and to perceive the witness only in
terms of known character traits. The "halo effect" will induce jurors to
view the impeached witness solely on the basis of the known dominant
characteristic, as evidenced by the conviction, and to reject any possibil-
ity that the witness is anything but thoroughly unsavory. Not only will
the persuasiveness of the witness' testimony be devastated, but the jurors
are also likely to infer that the witness' pretrial conduct accords with his
reprehensible character. 169 Because these inferential processes are in-
nate, even well-intentioned, conscientious jurors are prone to these dis-
tortions 17 and, consequently, to inferential error in their award of a
information. Id. A third group was also told that the speaker was a member of the
audience, but the speaker was introduced as a former "delinquent. .. [who] was cur-
rently involved in some shady transactions, being out on bail after arrest on a charge of
dope peddling." Id. at 32. Although the content of the communication did not vary at
all, audience judgments concerning the value and fairness of the presentations differed
greatly. The audience evaluated the "judge's" presentation as the highest, the "delin-
quent's" as lowest, and the unidentified person's as intermediate, but closer to the judge's
ratings. See id. Also of importance, the group hearing the "judge's" speech favored the
most lenient treatment of juvenile offenders; with the group hearing the "delinquent's"
speech favoring the harshest. Id. at 32-33.
Empirical data demonstrating that negative traits exert far greater influence on audi-
ence receptivity than counterpart positive traits also bear upon the testimonial appeal of
witnesses. See Levin, Wall, Dolegal & Norman, Differential Weighting of Positive and
Negative Traits in Impression Formation as a Function of Prior Exposure, 96 J. Exper.
Psych. 114, 114 (1972); see also Lawson, supra note 4, at 776; supra note 4. This phenom-
enon is especially troubling, because in a civil case, evidence of good character is not
permitted. Fed. R. Evid. 404, 405. Jurors hear only specific conduct proof-including
prior convictions-leading to inference of negative character, without benefit, unlike
criminal cases, of countervailing evidence of good character. Fed. R. Evid. 404(a)(1).
168. See supra notes 58-86 and accompanying text.
169. For example:
A man is under suspicion of murder. During the investigation certain definite
abnormalities of his sexual behavior come to light, even though there is no evi-
dence that they are related in any way to the committed murder. [T]he frequent
reaction of many people, if verbalized, would read something like this: "This
man whose sexual life deviates so strangely from the norm can also be expected
to deviate from other social norms in any other respect."
Ichheiser, supra note 157, at 27-28 (emphasis added).
170. See Vernon, supra note 131, at 36; P. Warr & C. Knapper, The Perception of
People and Events 16 (1968); see also S. Asch, supra note 156, at 258 (difficult to forget an




Numerous factors, otherwise irrelevant to credibility, operate in the
litigation context and affect the testimonial appeal of witnesses. For ex-
ample, all jurors approach their factfinding responsibility with accumu-
lated experiences, biases and preconceptions. 171 A person filters new
information through information stored in aggregated memory of past
experience, and draws on the stored data in forming new impressions and
beliefs about new information received. 172 A person is likely to readily
assimilate new information that confirms the pre-existing accumulation
of experience, bias and preconception yet resist and undervalue conflict-
ing data. 173 A person's assessment of neutral data is tinged by this innate
tendency to achieve consistency. Inferential error occurs when a per-
son's "filter" is permeated by misconceptions, and thus inaccurately por-
trays objective reality. 174 Yet, these "filters" function without conscious
effort. A person is thus unaware of the lack of objectivity with which the
"fiter" appraises trial information. 1 75
Moreover, a witness' demeanor, appearance and apparel exert great
influence on juror receptivity of his testimony. Jurors tend to remain
receptive to testimony of witnesses they "like," and to disregard testi-
mony of "disliked" witnesses. 176 Jurors tend to make these judgments on
the basis of superficial, utterly irrelevant, physical characteristics. 177
In all likelihood, these factors of bias and demeanor often sway jurors'
consideration of testimony far beyond their genuine probity. Yet, these
factors are beyond judicial or legislative control. The law can do no
more than allow advocates to dismiss both jurors whose biases are ex-
treme or specific to the present case, 178 and jurors who appear unduly
sensitive to apparel, appearance or demeanor. 179
When a civil witness' prior convictions are revealed there is a danger
that jurors will reflexively reject any information offered by a "common
criminal." They will draw negative inferences about his conduct in the
present case if he is a party, or about the moral quality of the party who
171. The psychology term describing this process is "knowledge structures." See R.
Nisbett & L. Ross, supra note 156, at 28-42; Gold, supra note 65, at 521-23.
172. See R. Nisbett & L. Ross, supra note 156, at 28-42, 167-92.
173. See id.; Gold, supra note 65, at 521; Rhode, supra note 54, at 561.
174. See R. Nisbett & L. Ross, supra note 156, at 195-227; Gold, supra note 65, at 521-
22.
175. See R. Nisbett & L. Ross, supra note 156, at 195-227; Gold, supra note 65, at 521-
22.
176. See C. Hovland, I. Janis & H. Kelley, supra note 166, at 33; Lawson, supra note 4,
at 770-71.
177. See A. Cohen, Attitude Change and Social Influence 28-29 (1964) (distinguishing
relevant aspects of persuasive communication, such as "intelligence, honesty, sincerity,
responsibility," from irrelevant aspects, those which "bear no objective relevance to the
topic of communication").
178. See D. Louisell, G. Hazard & C. Tait, Pleading and Procedure 967 (5th ed. 1983)
(describing challenges for cause).
179. See id. at 968 (describing peremptory challenges).
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presented him if he is not. The judgmental error induced by prior con-
victions evidence can be ameliorated simply by modifying the existing
rule.
Psychology research, although persuasive, does not provide sufficient
justification for revolutionizing the impeachment process in civil cases.
It does, however, further undermine the assumptions held by proponents
of the traditional view about the wisdom of using character evidence to
impeach civil witnesses. Considered in conjunction with legal arguments
that prior convictions evidence is, at best, minimally probative and enor-
mously prejudicial, the psychology data force the inquiry: What justifi-
cations for preserving this avenue of impeachment remain?
IV. A RECOMMENDATION FOR REFORM
Commentators have argued that Rule 609(a) should not apply to civil
cases, so that the residual balancing process of Rule 403 would govern
admissibility of convictions to impeach civil witnesses.1 80 This sugges-
tion implicitly recognizes the fundamental difference between criminal
and civil litigation, but affording the trial judge the meager discretion
allotted by Rule 403 is insufficient to counter the severe risks of prejudice
and inferential error that convictions evidence imports into the trial
process.
A. The Focus of Civil Litigation: Conduct, Not Character
The focus of civil litigation is a comparative evaluation of the persua-
siveness of plaintiff's claims and defendant's defenses.18 The critical is-
sues relate to the conduct of the respective parties concerning the event
giving rise to the cause of action. 182 Assessment of the parties' conduct
results in either a judgment and damages, or other requested relief, for
plaintiff, or a judgment of non-liability for defendant. Justice is served
when the trial process is fair, permitting each party to introduce evidence
relevant to the conduct at issue. No moral stigma attaches to a civil
verdict. 83 The character of the parties is wholly irrelevant to the funda-
180. See supra notes 8, 41-48 and accompanying text.
181. The arguments advanced here also apply to other forms of character-impugning
impeachment devices, such as evidence of reputation or opinion of bad character for
veracity, Fed. R. Evid. 608(a), or prior specific acts, Fed. R. Evid. 608(b). This Article
addresses only prior convictions, for the reasons stated at note 16, supra, and its propos-
als would leave Rule 608(a) and (b) intact. Neither reputation/opinion evidence nor
prior specific instances of untruth are likely to inculcate the trier of fact with the same
degree of prejudice as that flowing from the legal and social stigma of a criminal convic-
tion. Reform in these areas, although desirable, is less pressing.
182. In criminal cases, the defendant is permitted to rely upon his good character, see
Fed. R. Evid. 404(a)(1); Uviller, Evidence of Character to Prove Conduct: Illusion, Illogic,
and Injustice in the Courtroom, 130 U. Pa. L. Rev. 845, 855 (1982), and, in self-defense
cases to impugn the victim's character to substantiate his claim of innocence. See Fed. R.
Evid. 404(a)(2).
183. Egregious conduct motivated by ill will, maliciousness or conscious disregard for
others' rights, however, is penalized by an award of punitive damages. See Smith v.
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mental issue of conduct, and is meticulously rejected when offered to
raise circumstantial inferences of conduct. 184
Importing character evidence into the civil trial process in the form of
prior convictions allows parties to accomplish through the side-door of
impeachment precisely what the exclusion of character evidence as sub-
stantive proof of conduct is intended to obviate.185 The jury is apt to
engage in a comparative moral evaluation of parties and their witnesses
and, in all likelihood, will view prior convictions as revelatory of con-
duct.186  The temptation is to reward the "good" litigant with a
favorable verdict, or conversely, to punish the "bad" litigant with an un-
favorable verdict.18
7
Civil adjudication accomplishes more than resolution of immediate
disputes. That is, "adjudication should be viewed as a form of social
ordering, as a way in which the relations of [persons] to one another are
Wade, 461 U.S. 30 (1983); Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 119 Cal. App. 3d 757, 174 Cal.
Rptr. 348 (1981). Even so, it is the character of defendant's conduct, not the character of
defendant, that determines the propriety of the award.
184. See Fed. R. Evid. 404, 405. Federal cases sanction the use of character evidence
in civil cases, at least if close to being criminal in nature, despite the prohibition expressed
in the federal rules. See, eg., Perrin v. Anderson, 784 F.2d 1040, 1043-46 (10th Cir.
1986) (proof of victim's previous violent encounters with police admitted to demonstrate
victim provoked altercation with police in which he was killed); Carson v. Polley, 689
F.2d 562, 575-76 (5th Cir. 1982) (exceptions to Rule 404(a) allowing character evidence
to apply to civil cases); Crumpton v. Confederation Life Ins. Co., 672 F.2d 1248, 1253
(5th Cir. 1982) (opinion evidence as to the deceased's good character allowed in civil
action on the issue of whether deceased had committed a rape); Hackbart v. Cincinnati
Bengals, Inc., 601 F.2d 516, 525-26 (10th Cir.) (character evidence allowed in civil action
examining whether defendant was a "dirty football player"), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 931
(1979).
Although substantive use of character evidence in civil cases is far beyond the scope of
this Article, this extension of character evidence is unwarranted and potentially limitless.
In a civil assault and battery action, both plaintiff and defendant are likely to testify. The
jury should be trusted to reconstruct the incident in question from their testimony and
that of their witnesses. The "civil analogue" theory is difficult to restrict: wrongful death
is an analogue of murder; civil fraud is an analogue of criminal fraud; conversion is an
analogue of theft, and so forth. Aside from actions grounded in negligence or strict liabil-
ity, almost every civil action has a criminal analogue. Allowing character proof in these
cases would virtually destroy the prohibitory rule to no good purpose.
185. See Radtke v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 707 F.2d 999 (8th Cir. 1983). Plaintiffs sued
for injuries sustained when the aircraft in which they were passengers crashed upon take-
off. Plaintiffs alleged that the pilot lost control because his seat unexpectedly became
unlatched, and sued the manufacturer on a products liability theory. The manufacturer
claimed that the accident was attributable to pilot error. At trial, Cessna impeached the
pilot, a principal witness for plaintiffs, with a six-year-old multi-count felony drug convic-
tion. A verdict for defendant was affirmed.
Of course, Cessna could have offered evidence of the" pilot's drug use at the time of the
accident as substantive proof of lack of due care. That Cessna did not offer this evidence
indicates that Cessna had no such proof. Yet Cessna achieved the same effect-raising an
inference of lack of due care attributable to drug use-by using the side door of
impeachment.
186. See supra notes 82-91 and accompanying text.
187. See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
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governed and regulated." '188 The status of a person as a convicted felon
is immaterial to the allocation of that person's rights. A convicted felon
should be entitled to recover damages if struck by a negligently driven
truck;189 a woman convicted of murder is entitled to be free from un-
wanted sexual advances by a prison guard;190 and an arrestee is entitled
to be free from unnecessary physical violence by arresting officers. 91
These rights are not affected by the character of the individuals who hold
them, nor should the process by which these rights are adjudicated be
infected with irrelevant proof of their character. Uniform treatment of
character evidence, whether offered as circumstantial proof of conduct or
of credibility, would enhance the fairness of the civil trial process.
Despite these justifications for abolishing the practice, two reasons ex-
plain the continued use of prior convictions to impeach civil witnesses:
first, the law's historic dependence upon certain aspects of character
proof in the trial process; and second, the need to admit all evidence
probative of the critical question of credibility.
The law's historic reliance upon character proof in the trial process is a
concern of some weight. Evidence law is amendable to reform, as exem-
plified by certain changes in common law evidence principles worked by
the Federal Rules of Evidence.1 92 The Supreme Court recognized in a
188. See Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, reprinted in G. Hazard & J.
Vetter, Perspectives on Civil Procedure 17-18 (1987).
189. See Linskey v. Hecker, 753 F.2d 199 (1st Cir. 1985). In Linskey the plaintiff was
hit by a truck while riding his bicycle when he was fourteen years old. By the time the
action finally came to trial, he was twenty one years old. In the interim, the plaintiff was
convicted fifteen times-seven larcenies, six burglaries, one armed robbery, and one shop-
lifting conviction. All of these convictions were admitted to impeach the plaintiff's be-
lievability. A verdict for defendant was affirmed. The appellate court assured that no
undue prejudice resulted from these convictions because "[tihe jury was instructed to
consider the evidence only in evaluating [plaintiff's] credibility." Id. at 202.
190. See Garnett v. Kepner, 541 F. Supp. 241 (M.D. Pa. 1982). In Garnett, the plain-
tiff, an inmate, won a substantial judgment for compensatory and punitive damages in-
curred when defendant, an employee of the institution, allegedly coerced her to have
sexual relations with him. The trial court excluded plaintiff's convictions for second-
degree murder, burglary, arson, recklessly endangering another person, and risking and
causing a catastrophe, on the ground that these crimes, being crimes of passion and vio-
lence, manifest low probative value on the issue of credibility. Nevertheless, the trial
judge vacated the judgment and ordered a new trial in response to defendant's motion for
judgment notwithstanding the verdict. The trial judge reasoned that although plaintiff
was "extensively impeached" by her own varied recitals of the incident, her "youth and
subdued appearance" might have influenced the jury. "Evidence of her prior crimes may
have changed the jury's evaluation of her truthfulness." Id. at 245. Because the trial
judge had already found the prior crimes to be lacking in probative value, it must be
assumed that the potential persuasiveness of this proof lay in its power to influence the
jury to decide that plaintiff was a morally reprehensible person. Many inferences flow
from this finding, only one of which is that plaintiff's testimony should be viewed with
skepticism.
191. See Hannah v. City of Overland, 795 F.2d 1385, 1391-92 (8th Cir. 1986) (error,
albeit harmless, to admit plaintiff's convictions for rape, sodomy, kidnapping, larceny,
receiving stolen property, and burglary, in a § 1983 action against the police and city).
192. See, e.g., Fed. 1. Evid. 412 (prior sexual behavior of complaining witness in sex
offense prosecution generally excluded); Fed. R. Evid. 703 (expert witness can consider
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different context that "we cannot escape the reality that the law on occa-
sion adheres to doctrinal concepts long after the reasons which gave birth
to them have disappeared and after experience suggests the need for
change." '193 As discussed above, the premises underlying Rule 609(a)
have been discredited. 194 Thus, even centuries of conditioning to accept
prior convictions proof do not justify perpetuating this impeachment
device.195
Prior convictions evidence is not probative of in-court credibility and
is, in fact, unduly prejudicial.'96 Furthermore, prior convictions proof-
indeed, character proof generally-is, at best, a flimsy impeachment de-
vice. It is generally agreed that most testimonial inaccuracies stem not
from witness prevarication, but from perceptual and memory flaws. 19 7
Character proof, which suggests lack of compunction in the witness
about fabrication, is powerless to address this most potent problem in
evaluating witness credibility. Where testimonial falsehood is to be
probed, revealing a witness' precise biases and predilections is immeasur-
ably more effective.' 98 Specific contradiction, whether by the witness'
own previous statements or by other contrary information is also more
effective. 199
any data generally "relied upon by experts in the particular field"); Fed. R. Evid.
801(d)(1)(A) (certain prior inconsistent statements made under oath admissible as sub-
stantive proof).
193. Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 48 (1980).
194. See supra text accompanying notes 61-179.
195. See Gold, supra note 65, at 499 ("the law of evidence [should] pay attention to
how people think").
The law's treatment of evidence of prior sexual behavior of the victim provides an apt
analogy. Traditionally, the victim's "character," as evidenced by her prior sexual con-
tacts, was deemed probative of the consensual nature of her conduct with the defendant.
The law remained impervious to criticisms of this practice, and to the adverse systemic
effects it perpetuated, until political pressures arising from the women's movement forced
statutory protections for victims of sexual assault and rape. Rejection is now virtually
universal. See, e.g., Fed. R. Evid. 412 (generally excluding prior sexual behavior of al-
leged victim in sex offense prosecution). See generally Berger, Man's Trial, Woman's
Tribulation: Rape Cases in the Courtroom, 77 Colum. L. Rev. 1 (1977); Tanford &
Bocchino, Rape Victim Shield Laws and the Sixth Amendment, 128 U. Pa. L. Rev. 544
(1980); Comment, The Rape Shield Paradox: Complainant Protection Amidst Oscillating
Trends of State Judicial Interpretation, 78 J. Crim. Law & Crim. 644 (1987).
Persons affected by Rule 609 in civil cases have little cohesiveness as a political force.
Yet the premise underlying Rule 609 is no more valid than the now-discredited premise
concerning prior conduct of the rape or sexual assault victim.
196. See supra text accompanying notes 117-79.
197. See generally E. Loftus, Memory (1980); J. Marshall, Law and Psychology in
Conflict (2d ed. 1980); A. Yarmey, The Psychology of Eyewitness Testimony (1979);
Levine & Tapp, The Psychology of Criminal Identification: The Gap From Wade To
Kirby, 121 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1079 (1973); Spector & Foster, Admissibility of Hypnotic State-
ments: Is the Law of Evidence Susceptible?, 38 Ohio St. L.J. 567 (1977); Stewart, Percep-
tion, Memory and Hearsay. A Criticism of Present Law and the Proposed Federal Rules of
Evidence, 1970 Utah L. Rev. 1; Note, Did Your Eyes Deceive You? Expert Psychological
Testimony on the Unreliability of Eyewitness Identification, 29 Stan. L. Rev. 969 (1977).
198. See supra note 109 and accompanying text.
199. See supra notes 111-12 and accompanying text.
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In exchange for use of this inept form of credibility determinant, the
law heaps upon previously convicted civil litigants and their witnesses
powerful disincentives to testify. It rewards a decision to offer testimony
with the disclosure of embarrassing, often secret, information and the
potential of an adverse verdict.2co Moreover, Rule 609(a) gives rise to
the possibility that a civil litigant will call the opponent, or a person with
information useful to the opponent, as an adverse witness, and then re-
veal the prior conviction under the guise of impeachment, so that even
foregoing testimony is not always a safe option."0°
If existing methods for determining credibility are insufficient, then it
is incumbent upon lawmakers to develop more effective devices. Reflex-
ive dependence upon prior convictions as a veracity indicator exacts too
high a price in terms of the fairness of the civil litigation process, a price
that should no longer be tolerated.
Abrogating judicial discretion to admit prior convictions for impeach-
ment purposes in civil cases is a drastic measure, but the Federal Rules of
Evidence rescind inherent judicial discretion by declaring inadmissible
many forms of proof where slight probative worth is outweighed by un-
fair prejudice.20 Because the appeal of prior convictions evidence is intu-
itive, reserving any discretion to the trial judge to admit the evidence in
some circumstances would yield varying constructions, individualized as-
sessments of probative worth and prejudice, and glaringly inconsistent
results.2"3 Appellate review of trial court decisions concerning prior con-
200. See supra notes 88-99 and accompanying text. Revealing a witness' prior convic-
tion in the course of a civil trial also undermines the societal aspiration that the convicted
person, having "paid his debt to society," is free to redeem himself by reforming his
conduct and reassuming his place in society. Use of the conviction to impeach the civil
witness unnecessarily burdens the witness with the albatross of the past.
201. Fed. R. Evid. 607. See Murr v. Stinson, 752 F.2d 233, 235 (6th Cir. 1985) (de-
fendant chose not to testify, but plaintiff called him as an adverse witness and impeached
him with two wholly unrelated convictions for conspiracy); see also Spell v. McDaniel,
606 F. Supp. 1416, 1420 (E.D.N.C. 1985) (defendant chose not to testify because of possi-
bility of impeachment).
Another systemic effect of using prior convictions to impeach civil witnesses should be
noted. In a criminal case, charges will be brought, in all likelihood, even if the prosecu-
tor's witnesses are impeachable as convicted persons. When charges are brought, the
criminal defendant will defend the charge, even though he, and/or his witnesses, have
previously been convicted. The prior record might encourage the prosecutor and defend-
ant to plea bargain more willingly. In civil cases, especially in civil rights and torts claims
where the issue arises most frequently, the question becomes whether the convicted plain-
tiff will hesitate to file suit, and the convicted defendant will hesitate to defend a claim or
whether the terms of any settlement will be dictated or influenced by the prior convic-
tions of either party.
202. See supra notes 63-64 and accompdnying text. Indeed, Congress did abrogate
discretion concerning crimes of dishonesty and false statement. See Fed. R. Evid.
609(a)(2).
203. For an example of the multiplicity of judicial positions as to the proper construc-
tion of the language of Rule 609(a)(1), see supra notes 36-52 and accompanying text.
Compare Boyer v. Chicago & N.W. Transp. Co., 603 F. Supp. 132 (D. Minn. 1985)
(possession of cocaine with intent to distribute not admissible to impeach civil plaintiff)
and Tussel v. Witco Chem. Corp., 555 F. Supp. 979 (W.D. Pa. 1983) (conspiracy to
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victions, generally restricted to correcting abuse of discretion 2" and gen-
erous in finding "harmless error," ' does little to mitigate these
problems.2z 6
Congress has shown little concern for the effect of impeachment by
prior convictions upon civil litigation2 7 and is undisturbed at the pros-
pect of nullifying judicial discretion in order to achieve desired policy
goals.208 At least one state has already abolished the practice of using
prior convictions to impeach witnesses, including civil witnesses.20 9 Con-
gress should reconsider the realities of the degree to which prior convic-
tions proof is dysfunctional in the civil context, and amend Rule 609 to
accord with these realities by abolishing the use of prior convictions in
civil cases.
B. Alternatives to Abolishing Impeachment by Prior
Convictions: Rule 609(a)(1)
Courts have proposed a number of approaches to the problem of con-
struing the current version of Rule 609(a) in the civil context. In demon-
strating the insufficiency of each of these approaches, this Article
import a controlled substance not admissible to impeach civil plaintiff) with Murr v. Stin-
son, 752 F.2d 233 (6th Cir. 1985) (convictions for conspiracy to aid and abet importation
and distribution of cocaine admissible to impeach civil defendant) and Radtke v. Cessna
Aircraft Co., 707 F.2d 999 (8th Cir. 1983) (felony drug conviction admissible to impeach
civil witness).
For a discussion of the confusion engendered by courts' disagreement about the extent
of discretion allocated to the trial judge under Rule 609(a)(1), see infra text accompany-
ing notes 225-26.
.Professors Beaver and Marques warn that "[e]ach trial judge's application of the
weighing process reflects personal predilections and an individual assessment of local pol-
icies." Beaver & Marques, supra note 3, at 616 (footnotes omitted).
204. See, eg., Jones v. Collier, 762 F.2d 71, 72 (8th Cir. 1985); Murr v. Stinson, 752
F.2d 233, 235 (6th Cir. 1985); Calhoun v. Baylor, 646 F.2d 1158, 1163 (6th Cir. 1981).
205. See, e.g., Hannah v. City of Overland, 795 F.2d 1385, 1391-92 (8th Cir. 1986);
Czajka v. Hickman, 703 F.2d 317, 318-19 (8th Cir. 1983).
206. Moreover, restricting the scope of proof concerning underlying details of the pre-
vious crime does not ameliorate the inherent prejudice of this proof, contrary to the sug-
gestion of some courts. See, e.g., Campbell v. Greer, 831 F.2d 700, 707-08 (7th Cir.
1987); United States v. Sampol, 636 F.2d 621, 670 n.40 (D.C. Cir. 1980). Once the fact of
a prior conviction becomes evident, no further details are required to commence the pro-
cess of moral evaluation of the impeached witness.
Another argument in favor of abrogating judicial discretion concerning prior convic-
tions is that of efficiency-eliminating balancing and discretion obviates the need for pre-
trial and in-trial hearings. Of course, efficiency in and of itself is a weak reason for nulli-
fying the trial judge's discretionary control over some aspects of the trial process. But,
given the enormous problems that permeate the civil trial process as a result of prior
convictions evidence, see supra notes 61-114, 180-201 and accompanying text, efficiency
would be a welcome by-product of abolishing discretionary rulings on this evidence.
207. See supra notes 28-31 and accompanying text.
208. See supra notes 22-27 and accompanying text.
209. Montana has adopted a rule wholly contrary to Federal Rule 609. Montana's
version of this rule provides that "[f]or the purpose of attacking the credibility of a wit-
ness, evidence that he has been convicted of a crime is not admissible." Mont. Code Ann.
tit. 26, ch. 10, Rule 609 (1987).
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considers the two subsections of Rule 609(a) independently, for each
raises different considerations.
1. Per Se Admissibility
Some courts construe Rule 609(a)(1) as requiring admissibility of all
felony convictions offered to impeach all civil witnesses.21° Although
this construction is most faithful to the language of the rule, the per se
admissibility approach injects unnecessary and positively harmful preju-
dice into the civil trial process, with no concomitant gain in credibility
assessment, and thus should be rejected.
2. Rule 609(a)(1) Balancing
Rule 609(a)(1) articulates a rigorous balancing test to be used in crimi-
nal cases; one which, theoretically, should result in exclusion of all but
the most probative of felony crimes offered to impeach. The proponent
of the impeachment proof must demonstrate that its probative value as a
credibility determinant outweighs its prejudicial effect.2 ' Some courts
have imported this rigorous balancing process into civil litigation. 12
This approach is unavailing for two reasons.
The first difficulty with extending the "probative-value-exceeds-preju-
dice" balance articulated in Rule 609(a)(1) to civil cases lies in how
courts should assess the probative value and prejudice inherent in a par-
ticular conviction. Assuming that the Luck-Gordon factors213 provide a
framework for Rule 609(a)(1)'s balancing process, the civil litigant, un-
protected by constitutional safeguards, 214 and impelled by need to com-
municate his version of disputed factors to the jurors, will invariably
choose to testify. Moreover, the prior crime will seldom be similar to the
cause of action at issue in civil litigation, given the negligence or strict
liability bases underlying most civil cases.21 5 Of the three remaining fac-
tors-nature of the crime, remoteness of the prior conviction and the
witness' subsequent history, and the importance of the credibility ques-
210. See supra notes 36-38 and accompanying text; see also ABA Proposed Draft,
supra note 12, at 59.
211. See Fed. R. Evid. 609(a)(1).
212. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
213. See supra note 72 and accompanying text. The list of five factors applicable under
the Luck-Gordon doctrine must be modified to three factors, because neither the factor of
"necessity for the criminal defendant's testimony" nor the factor of "similarity between
the past crime and the charged crime" are pertinent to civil adjudication. The three
factors that remain applicable are the nature of the crime, the remoteness of the prior
conviction and the witness' subsequent history, and the importance of the credibility
question.
214. See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
215. Of course, exceptions occur when the basis for the civil claim or defense is inten-
tional conduct, or even negligent conduct that has a criminal law analogue, such as that
resulting in wrongful death. See supra note 184. In these cases, admitting the prior crime
to impeach a civil litigant would raise acute problems under Fed. R. Evid. 404(b), and the
"similarity" factor would be significant.
1988]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
tion-only two are viable balancing determinants, because the remote-
ness question is generally decided automatically as a matter of statutory
law.2 16
Rule 609(a)(1) addresses felony convictions that are not so probative
of credibility that their admission is mandated under Rule 609(a)(2).
Whatever significance these felony convictions have for determining a
witness' in-court veracity lies in the inferences of general bad character
and consequent tendency to fabricate testimony under oath that stem
intuitively from conviction of a felony crime.2 17 Despite the tenuousness
of these inferences,"' some courts have indicated a willingness to find
probative value even in violent felony crimes, and thus admit these vio-
lent crimes for purposes of evaluating veracity.219
Even if these two factors are sufficient to assess the probative worth of
prior convictions evidence in civil cases, a related difficulty arises in the
process of evaluating the prejudicial effect of the evidence.220 Prejudice
goes beyond shame or embarrassment when a non-litigant civil witness is
impeached. It adversely affects the party who presented the witness, 221 a
factor courts sometimes overlook.222 This type of prejudice, whether the
impeached witness is a party or not, is often difficult to detect and mea-
sure.223 Yet the jury, aided by a limiting instruction, is generally deemed
to be capable of properly taking into account even this highly prejudicial
data.224
A second difficulty of the Rule 609(a)(1) balancing process is how
much discretion the rule affords the trial judge in balancing these factors.
Courts disagree as to whether the trial judge retains only narrow discre-
tion in view of the congressional mandate for certainty and predictability
associated with Rule 609(a)(l), 225 or broad discretion, reviewable only in
instances of abuse.22 6 This dispute, coupled with judicial disagreement as
216. See supra note 72.
217. See supra notes 61-71 and accompanying text.
218. See supra notes 72-117 and accompanying text.
219. See, e.g., Jones v. Collier, 762 F.2d 71, 72 n.2 (8th Cir. 1985) (civil plaintiff's
burglary and rape convictions admissible); Petty v. Ideco, 761 F.2d 1146, 1152 (5th Cir.
1985) (civil plaintiff impeached by conviction for armed kidnapping, as well as issuing a
fraudulent check); United States v. Lipscomb, 702 F.2d 1049, 1062 (D.C. Cir. 1983)
("Congress believed that all felonies have some probative value on the issue of credibil-
ity."); NLRB v. Jacob E. Decker & Sons, 569 F.2d 357, 363 (5th Cir. 1978) (same).
220. Compare supra notes 79-81 and accompanying text with supra note 94 and accom-
panying text.
221. See supra notes 96-97 and accompanying text.
222. See, e.g., Radtke v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 707 F.2d 999 (8th Cir. 1983); Moore v.
Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 575 F. Supp. 919 (D. Md. 1983).
223. See supra notes 107, 115 and accompanying text.
224. See supra notes 100-06 and accompanying text.
225. See, e.g., Christmas v. Sanders, 759 F.2d 1284, 1289-93 (7th Cir. 1985); United
States v. Hendershot, 614 F.2d 648, 653 (9th Cir. 1980); United States v. Cook, 608 F.2d
1175, 1187 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1034 (1980); see also Weinstein's Evi-
dence, supra note 18, 609[06], at 609-109 (judge has limited discretion).
226. See, e.g., United States v. Beltran, 761 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1985); United States v.
Key, 717 F.2d 1206, 1209 (8th Cir. 1983); United States v. Kiendra, 663 F.2d 349, 353
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to whether Rule 609(a)(1) obligates trial judges to articulate their find-
ings concerning the rule's balancing process on the record,227 leads to
unpredictable, uneven results at the trial level.228 Frequently, appeals
from prior convictions rulings are automatically affirmed on appeal be-
cause "appellate courts are loath to reverse the court below when the
trial judge examined the pertinent factors and applied them to the facts
presented.
229
These difficulties raise dangers, beyond unpredictability, to the fairness
of the civil trial process. Overestimating the probative worth of prior
convictions has led to wholesale admission of evidence that conveys little
about believability, yet is highly prejudicial.230 There is, in addition, lit-
tle effective recourse available on appeal because of the degree of discre-
tion residing in the trial judge and flexibility concerning the obligation to
articulate findings on the record. Thus judicial accountability has been
undermined and this, in turn, has led to unprincipled decisions.231
3. Rule 403 Balancing
A number of courts have questioned whether Rule 609(a)(1) is appli-
cable to civil cases, and resort instead to the residual balancing process
stated in Rule 403 to determine the admissibility of felony convictions
offered to impeach civil witnesses.2 32 Unlike Rule 609(a)(1), which bur-
dens the proponent of the evidence to demonstrate that its probative
value exceeds its prejudicial effect, Rule 403 burdens the opponent of the
evidence to demonstrate that its prejudice substantially exceeds its proba-
tive value.233 Congress' thorough consideration of Rule 609(a)(1)'s effect
(lst Cir. 1981); Howard v. Gonzales, 658 F.2d 352, 359 (5th Cir. Unit A Oct. 1981);
United States v. De La Torre, 639 F.2d 245, 249 (5th Cir. Unit A Mar. 1981); United
States v. Field, 625 F.2d 862, 871 (9th Cir. 1980).
227. Compare United States v. Alvarez, 833 F.2d 724, 727 (7th Cir. 1987) (so long as
trial judge holds a hearing on admissibility of Rule 609(a)(1) proof and properly instructs
the jury, no error occurs where judge implicitly balances factors considered yet does not
record the findings on the record) and United States v. Mahone, 537 F.2d 922, 928-29
(7th Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1025 (1976) with United States v. Hendershot,
614 F.2d 648, 652-53 (9th Cir. 1980) (trial court must clearly articulate the balancing
process employed) and United States v. Preston, 608 F.2d 626, 639 (5th Cir. 1979)
(same), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 904 (1980).
228. See Note, Suggestions for Confining and Guiding Trial Court Discretion, supra
note 3, at 664-65.
229. See Weinstein's Evidence, supra note 18, t 609[04], at 609-93.
230. See Beaver & Marques, supra note 3, at 591 (reporting that level of impeachment
by prior convictions of criminal defendants has continued unabated after enactment of
Rule 609(a)(1) at a rate of seventy-two percent of all cases in which defendants testify on
their own behalf).
231. See Surratt, supra note 3, at 946-49.
232. See supra notes 40-48 and accompanying text. One court relies upon the inherent
discretion afforded by Rules 102 and 609(a) to vest flexibility in the trial judge. See
United States v. Jackson, 405 F. Supp. 938, 940-43 (E.D.N.Y. 1975). This Article rejects
this approach for the same reason it rejects the Rule 403 balancing process.
233. See Boyer v. Chicago & N.W. Transp. Co., 603 F. Supp. 132, 133-34 (D. Minn.
1985); Moore v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 575 F. Supp. 919, 921-22 (D. Md. 1983).
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indicates that, in criminal cases at least, this difference in burdens was
intentional.234
The residual Rule 403 balancing test is the unanimous choice of other
commentators who have addressed the applicability of Rule 609(a)(1) to
civil cases. 235 However, reliance on Rule 403's minimal balancing pro-
cess magnifies the difficulties in rejecting the Rule 609(a)(1) approach.
The adoption of Rule 403 as the guideline by which convictions are ad-
mitted to impeach civil witnesses ignores the extent to which the preju-
dice inherent in prior convictions evidence undermines the fairness of the
civil trial process. Concededly, prior convictions are less inflammatory
in civil than in criminal cases. Criminal cases, however, also invoke dif-
ferent balances between the litigants and additional considerations not
present in civil cases.236 The mere fact that this evidence is less inflam-
matory in civil cases does not render it harmless. Accordingly, a sub-
stantially less rigorous standard for admissibility is unwarranted.
The primary difficulty with evaluating admissibility of prior convic-
tions under Rule 403 is that this rule allows the trial judge only meager
discretion to exclude prior convictions,237 and affords litigants virtually
no recourse on appeal.238 As long as the prior conviction is deemed to
have even minimal probative value in evaluating veracity, the trial judge
is obliged to admit it, and this decision invariably will be affirmed on
appeal. 239
This Article focuses upon the dysfunctional effect of importing the un-
warrantedly prejudicial information sanctioned by Rule 609(a)(1) into
the civil trial process. In civil cases all energies and resources of litigants
and jurors should be concentrated on reconstructing a past event, not a
litigant's or witness' character. The law of evidence does not relegate
other types of evidence infused with prejudicial potential to the trial
judge's discretion; instead, the law declares such proof inadmissible.2' °
The nature and extent of prejudice endemic in prior convictions evidence
mandates the same result.
234. See supra notes 18-31 and accompanying text.
235. See sources cited supra note 8.
236. See supra note 16.
237. Rule 403 is a rule of inclusion. See, e.g., Wilson v. Attaway, 757 F.2d 1227, 1242
(1 th Cir. 1985) (upholding lower court's admission of evidence); Radtke v. Cessna Air-
craft Co., 707 F.2d 999, 1001 (8th Cir. 1983) (same); Czajka v. Hickman, 703 F.2d 317,
319 (8th Cir. 1983); Ebanks v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 688 F.2d 716, 722-23
(11th Cir. 1982) (Rule 403 is to be used very sparingly to exclude otherwise relevant
evidence), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1083 (1983); United States v. Dennis, 625 F.2d 782, 796-
97 (8th Cir. 1980) (balance should be struck in favor of admission); Weinstein's Evidence,
supra note 18, 403[01], at 403-09 (Rule 403 should be used sparingly).
238. Reversal is warranted only for abuse of discretion. See Weinstein's Evidence,
supra note 18, 403[01], at 403-09 & n.6.
239. See, e.g., Radtke v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 707 F.2d 999, 1000-01 (8th Cir. 1983);
Czajka v. Hickman, 703 F.2d 317, 318-19 (8th Cir. 1983).
240. See supra notes 63-64, 195 and accompanying text.
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C. Rule 609(a)(2): Recommendation and Alternatives
Despite judicial disagreement regarding the proper gauge by which to
determine admissibility of Rule 609(a)(1) felony convictions, courts are
unanimous in holding that Rule 609(a)(2) is absolute in its requirements
of admission of all convictions for crimes characterized as "dishonesty or
false statement" offenses.24' To argue that this nullification of discretion
should be cast in the opposite direction, so that even dishonesty and false
statement convictions would be excluded as impeachment devices, is con-
cededly more difficult in the face of the legislative history and the uni-
form judicial application of Rule 609(a)(2) in civil cases.
The rationale for granting automatic admission to all crimes of dishon-
esty and false statement is that the overwhelming probative value of spe-
cific previous acts manifests the witness' propensity to lie under grave
circumstances.242 Yet commentators have occasionally voiced skepti-
cism about the accuracy of this assertion.24 These doubts are vindicated
by the social psychology research previously discussed. 2 ' Acts of per-
jury, swindling, or bribery do not illuminate a character trait for lying on
the part of the actor. These acts are also virtually worthless as a predic-
tor of future behavior while under oath in court. In fact, the convicted
perjurer, fully aware of the consequences of perjury, is arguably less mo-
tivated to lie again under oath than is a person who has not previously
experienced conviction.
The stunning results of a recent psychological study demonstrate that
this dishonesty and false statement type of conviction is unduly prejudi-
cial.24 5 Adult subjects were divided into four groups.24 6 Each group was
given an identical fact pattern detailing the crime with which a hypothet-
ical criminal defendant was charged. One group was further informed
that defendant had no previous criminal record. A second group was
told that defendant had been previously convicted for perjury. A third
group was told that defendant had been previously convicted for a seri-
ous but dissimilar crime. A fourth group was informed that defendant
had been previously convicted for commission of the same crime. All
subjects were instructed specifically to consider the previous conviction
only in evaluating defendant's credibility as a witness.
241. See cases cited supra note 33. For discussion of courts' characterization of con-
victions as implicating dishonesty and false statement offenses, see Weinstein's Evidence,
supra note 18, % 609[04], at 609-77 to -85; Note, An Analysis of the Phrase "Dishonesty or
False Statement" as Used in Rule 609, 32 Okla. L. Rev. 427 (1979).
242. See United States v. Kuecker, 740 F.2d 496, 501-02 (7th Cir. 1984).
243. See Beaver & Marques, supra note 3, at 611; Spector, supra note 4, at 351; Note,
Other Crimes Evidence at Trial, supra note 1, at 778.
244. See supra notes 117-48 and accompanying text.
245. See Wissler & Saks, supra note 107, at 43-47.
246. The experiment used two different crimes, murder and auto theft, and four groups
for each, so that eight groups of subjects were actually used. Because results did not vary
from case to case, see Wissler & Saks, supra note 107, at 43, this Article refers only to the
division of subjects according to prior criminal record information made known to them
for purposes of convenience.
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Not surprisingly, the subjects who thought defendant had no previous
criminal involvement rated his credibility the highest. The subjects who
believed defendant to be a perjurer rated his credibility only slightly
lower than did subjects who believed defendant had been convicted for a
serious, dissimilar crime. The group informed that defendant had been
convicted for the same crime, however, rated his credibility the lowest by
a significant measure. Despite contrary instructions, 13 percent of sub-
jects voting to convict stated that the prior conviction was the motivating
factor in their decision. 47 The researchers concluded from this data
that, regardless of contrary instructions, jurors consider prior convictions
data to determine the likelihood of defendant's guilt, and not, as the law
assumes, to assess his believability.248
The implications of this study, in conjunction with the social psycho-
logical research previously discussed, are clear for civil cases. Jurors use
the inferences of general bad character available from previous convic-
tions proof as evidence of conduct, not as evidence of veracity. Limiting
instructions effective enough to curb this proclivity have not yet been,
and may never be, discovered. The only way to forestall the undue preju-
dice flowing from even dishonesty and false statement convictions is to
take the unorthodox, yet not wholly unprecedented, step of absolutely
banning their use as impeachment tools.249
1. Per Se Admissibility
At least four states have adopted the position that only crimes of dis-
honesty and false statement are admissible to impeach witnesses, includ-
ing civil witnesses. 250 This per se admissibility approach to convictions
for dishonesty and false statement allows the factfinder to consider too
much unduly prejudicial evidence of, at best, questionable probative
247. See id.
248. See id. at 43-47.
249. The State of Montana has statutorily enacted such a ban. See supra note 209 and
accompanying text.
250. Alaska, Hawaii and Kansas have accomplished this result by rule. See Alaska R.
of Evid. 609; Haw. R. of Evid. 609; Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-421 (1983).
The Michigan Supreme Court recently construed its version of Rule 609(a) different
than the federal rule in that it refers to crimes of "theft, dishonesty and false statement,"
Mich. R. of Evid. 609, as establishing bright line distinctions. The court held that crimes
containing an element of dishonesty or false statement are automatically admissible; most
other felonies are automatically ineligible for impeachment. A balancing test under
which, according to Michigan's Rule 609, probative value must exceed prejudice applies
to felony theft crimes. Significantly, the court ruled that the need for impeachment
evidence due to the centrality of the credibility issue is not a factor to be taken into
account in balancing probative value against prejudice. See People v. Allen, 429 Mich.
558, 594 n.16, 420 N.W.2d 499, 516 n.16 (1988).
On the federal level, one judge noted that "however sensible a nonabsolutist approach
may appear to some of us individually, we are driven by the force of explicit statutory
language and legislative history to hold that evidence offered under Rule 609(a)(2) is not
subject to the general balancing of Rule 403." United States v. Kiendra, 663 F.2d 349,
354 (1st Cir. 1981).
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value. If this per se admissibility approach is not rejected, Rule 609(a)(2)
must be modified so that the category of crimes of dishonesty and false
statement are defined precisely-"those crimes whose statutory elements
necessarily involve untruthfulness or falsification. '251
2. Rule 403 Balancing
Should Rule 609(a)(2) itself prove invulnerable to the myriad of argu-
ments raised against admissibility of even dishonesty and false statement
crimes, then the ABA Proposed Draft version of Rule 609(a)(2) should
be adopted.252 This proposal precisely and narrowly restricts the cate-
gory of evidence admitted as those crimes encompassing untruthfulness
or falsification as a statutory element, and affords Rule 403-type balanc-
ing discretion to the trial judge. This solution is not ideal, but perhaps
abolishing Rule 609(a)(1) in civil cases would make trial judges cogni-
zant that prior convictions proof is not a favored impeachment avenue.
The effect might be a more sparing use of discretion to admit prior con-
victions evidence offered under Rule 609(a)(2), particularly in close
cases.
CONCLUSION
The age-old edifice of character proof, although timeworn, still ap-
pears impervious to broad-scale revision. The pure intuitive appeal of
evidence suggesting that "the leopard does not change its spots" is com-
pelling. Yet this appeal is not inevitably irresistible; it is only because we
choose to make it so, and choose to shape the law accordingly.
Urging revision of character impeachment by banning the use of prior
convictions in civil litigation may seem drastic, especially where such evi-
dence is concededly less prejudicial than in criminal litigation. Yet civil
cases, unhampered by the considerations inherent in criminal cases, pres-
ent a forum in which the unduly prejudicial and barely probative nature
of prior convictions proof is starkly visible. Prior convictions evidence is
dysfunctional because of its tendency to induce inferential error. Further
judicial construction of Rule 609(a) is futile in terms of curing the rule's
drafting imprecisions and, more fundamentally, its erroneous policy
premises. Legislative revision is the only effective means to eliminate
prior convictions as impeachment proof in civil cases.
251. ABA Proposed Draft, supra note 12, at 56; see United States v. Lewis, 626 F.2d
940, 946 (D.C. Cir. 1980); Tussel v. Witeo Chem. Corp., 555 F. Supp. 979, 982 (W.D. Pa.
1983).
252. See supra note 13.
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